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market: the project 
and the reality 
Germánico Salgado* 
T h e purpose of the present article is to supply 
some background data for a redefinition of the 
objectives, methods and instruments of Latin 
American integration: a restatement of the case 
which the author considers an indispensable 
requisite for restoring vitality to the movement. 
In his opinion, Latin American ideas on integra-
tion have unfortunately clung too fast to theories 
whose validity for our societies is slight, and have 
a t tempted to keep in step with experiences in 
industrial countries which are remote from the 
realities of under-development. On the basis of 
the region's own experiences and oi clearer 
conceptions of what integration can be expected 
to offer, it is possible to inquire into which styles 
or patterns are technically suitable and which of 
them may be viable for Latin America. 
To this end, the article begins with a rapid 
review of the original CEPAL conceptions of 
Latin American integration, and goes on to 
analyse the evolution of ideas in the course of the 
negotiations that led to the establishment of the 
first integration groupings in Latin America. Next 
follows a brief outline of the obstacles which 
integration movements have really encountered 
on their path, both in Latin America and in the 
case of some experiments in the rest of the 
developing world; and in conclusion attention is 
drawn to some of the significant factors account-
ing for the problems by which integration has 
been beset, so as thence to deduce criteria that 
will be of he lp in forming opinions on the 
patterns and instruments of a viable integration 
programme. By way of final recapitulation, these 
concepts are contrasted with those that served as 
foundation-stones for the construction of the 
formulas on which Latin American integration 
has hitherto b e e n based. 
"Consultant to CEPAL. 
I 
The original CEPAL theses 
on a Latin American 
regional market 
A great deal of water has flowed under the 
bridges since CEPAL, in the Economic 
Survey of Latin America for 1949, began 
systematically to promote Latin American 
integration. A wait of rather more than ten 
years ensued before this study bore fruit and 
the first formal integration systems came into 
being. The course they followed was hope-
ful at first, then hazardous and wavering. To 
the original groupings others were later 
added, with their own conceptions and 
formulas. They too have moved on from an 
initial stage full of activity to phases of 
conflict and uncertainty. Some of the sys-
tems have overcome the worst problems; 
others are still sunk in stagnation. The 
experience gathered up to now indicates a 
difficult journey, with considerably fewer 
achievements and many more troubles than 
had been expected. Nevertheless, Latin 
American integration is still one of the 
aspirations of our peoples: a sort of intuitive 
response to some of our most deep-rooted 
problems, the logic of which is questioned 
by few. Experience has indeed left behind it 
a certain scepticism as to the viability of 
some of the objectives and methods that we 
have chosen hitherto and an awareness of 
the pitfalls along the road. But concern for 
the whole question is still alive in the rising 
generations of Latin Americans, as it was at 
the start of 1950 in the generation then 
beginning to assume responsibilities in 
national life. 
It is because of this, because that 
concern exists and experience has now been 
gained, that it is needful to lopk back on the 
past with a critical eye and strive to discover 
the direction that should be taken by this 
impulse towards integration, now to a great 
extent shackled by inappropriate formulas. 
Obviously, a critical survey of this kind must 
begin at CEPAL's original ideas on the 
subject, for in them lie the seeds of the 
movement that led to the first integration 
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efforts. And it is entirely symbolic of the 
intellectual freedom which was and is char-
acteristic of CEPAL, that these pages 
should make their modest contribution to 
the celebration of its thirty years of existence 
in the form of an analysis that starts by 
questioning some of its early conceptions. 
From the very outset, Latin American 
integration was one of the essential elements 
in CEPAL's theses on the development of 
the region. One example that has already 
been mentioned is afforded by the Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1949. As soon as a 
favourable opportunity offered itself, 
CEPAL intensified its promotional action, in 
which it never flagged until in 1960 the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association and the 
Central American Common Market were 
established. 
The opportunity arose as soon as the 
relative boom in Latin American exports 
which had accompanied the hostilities in 
Korea came to an end. As has happened 
since, the years of prosperity enjoyed by the 
region's foreign trade had engendered a less 
alert attitude to internal development prob-
lems, and had relegated the inducements to 
integration to a secondary plane. The de-
cline in the growth rate of exports which 
materialized in the years 1953 to 1955 
afforded a propitious opportunity for taking 
the initial political steps towards integration. 
The first session of the Trade Committe, 
held in November 1956, marked the begin-
ning of a phase of elucidation and negotia-
tion, which, as already stated, culminated in 
1960, after a series of meetings of various 
technical and political organs, convened, or 
at all event promoted, by CEPAL.1 
l T w o sessions of the Trade Committee (1956 and 
1959), two sessions of the Working Group on the Latin 
American Regional Market and three meetings for 
consultations on trade policy (1958 and 1959), apart 
from the meetings concerned with Central America, 
the sessions of the Central Banks Working Group, 
and the rounds of government negotiations which 
led to the signing of the Montevideo Treaty and of the 
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integra-
tion. 
Basically taking the existing documents 
as a guide, it is very difficult to identify a 
posteriori the original CEPAL theses on the 
patterns of integration formulas. But the 
arguments put forward unquestionably 
pointed to the need for integration. As they 
were repeated by the Commission on many 
occasions, they will not be restated in the 
present paper.2 But CEPAL's positions with 
respect to the characteristics of the proposed 
formula, its objectives and instruments, 
gradually took more definite shape in the 
course of the negotiations, and it is logical to 
suppose that the resulting theses reflected, 
up to a point, the tenor of the discussions, 
taking up aspects of the national views 
expressed which were useful for building up 
a consensus among the governments. Never-
theless, from analysis of the relevant docu-
ments, especially those pertaining to the 
early phases of the negotiations, some theses 
emerge which we believe to represent 
CEPAL's original opinions, and which are 
summed up below, although they relate 
basically to the global formula known by the 
name of a Latin American regional market. 
With the advance of the negotiations and the 
restriction of their geographical scope, the 
final outcome was the present Latin Ameri-
can Free-Trade Association (ALALC). So 
this is a context very different from that of the 
Central American integration programme, in 
which CEPAL likewise fulfilled a decisive 
promotional function, postulating theses 
which may to some extent differ from those 
set forth here. 
2 In this connexion suffice it to recall one or two 
sentences from a CEPAL document aimed at motivating 
governments: "Latin America ... will be unable to 
carry out its development plans, will be unable even 
to regain the rate of growth it achieved in the ten post-
war years, unless it makes a sustained effort to establish 
within its own territory the capital goods industries 
of which it is in such urgent need today, and which it 
will require on a large scale during the next quarter 
of a century" ... "In order to produce these capital 
goods and develop all the intermediate goods industries 
required ... Latin America needs a common market." 
See CEPAL, The Latin American Common Market, 
United Nations publication, Sales N.°: 59.II.G.4, 
Mexico, D.F., July 1959, p . 1. 
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The present paper, although it does 
allude to these differences, is chiefly con-
cerned with the positions emerging in 
connexion with the ALALC negotiations, 
since they are felt to have been of decisive 
importance in defining some of the parame-
ters on the basis of which Latin American 
integration was subsequently to evolve. 
Any omissions fallen into here in respect of 
Central American integration tend to impov-
erish the content of the concepts, especially 
those of CEPAL, but help to focus attention 
on a process which was originally intended 
to have the characteristics of a general 
formula for the whole of Latin America, and 
which, in this sense, bears the brunt of the 
responsibility for what Latin American inte-
gration has been and has failed to become. 
In the writer's opinion, the following 
were the most important of the CEPAL 
theses relating to the specific regional 
market formula. 
1. The need for realism and originality in 
the conception of the integration formula 
CEPAL repeatedly urged the desirability of 
advancing little by little, in accordance with 
the countries' differing situations, and 
stressed the advantages of flexibility in the 
instruments of integration. This attitude was 
evidenced in its opinions on the scope of the 
formulas to which it was advisable to resort. 
While maintaining the necessity of keeping 
the Latin American common market formula 
in sight as a final objective, CEPAL at the 
same time asserted that "It can be reached 
only by gradual stages. In the first of these, 
aspirations would have to be confined to 
partial but attainable targets; and would nec-
essarily have to be the patiently-nurtured 
issue of a policy conceived on realistic lines 
and implemented with firmness of pur-
pose".3 It also commented: "Hence ... the 
3 S e e CEPAL, The Latin American Common 
Market, op. cit., p . 5. As many references will be 
made to this work henceforward, all the quotations 
desirability of adopting highly flexible pro-
cedures and establishing far-sighted escape 
clauses during this experimental phase". 
It is important to recall that CEPAL gave 
its support to a formula for this first stage 
which was, in the last analysis, that of a 
preferential trade area, and declared itself in 
agreement with the targets recommended by 
the Working Group on the Latin American 
Regional Market which the secretariat con-
vened to deal with those specific topics. The 
objectives in question were to secure within 
ten years an appreciable reduction in the 
average level of tariff duties —many of 
which were to be eliminated— and the 
abolition of all tariff restrictions by virtue of 
an appropriate credits and payments régime. 
More ambitious proposals, such as full 
liberalization of trade and the construction of 
a common external tariff, would have to wait 
at least until the end of this experimental 
phase. 
The proposal that the average level of 
duties be reduced, put forward by the 
secretariat and taken up by the Working 
Group, had in CEPAL's view the advantage 
of flexibility; the levels could be different for 
different categories of products, and even 
within these categories, during the negotia-
tions each country could make distinctions 
between products as suited it best. The 
procedure would also allow different levels 
of reductions to be established in accordance 
with the disparities between countries in 
respect of their stages of development. 
2. The regional market ought to cover the 
whole of Latin America 
One of the reasons why CEPAL recom-
mended cautious progress was probably its 
insistence on the need for the formula to 
embrace the whole of Latin America. The 
preferential area should be set up with as 
taken from it will merely be followed by a number in 
brackets indicating the page on which the quotation 
appears. 
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many as possible of the countries of the 
region, and with a sufficient degree of open-
ness to facilitate the incorporation of those 
that did not participate from the start. 
CEPAL was steadfastly opposed to any kind 
of restriction of access which would involve 
the risk that exclusive groupings might be 
formed. If this were to happen, it said, "the 
initial group of countries would tend to 
withdraw into its shell, and other non-
members might attempt to form similar and 
equally exclusive groups. And instead of one 
huge Latin American common market there 
would be, after a time, a series of subregional 
clusters, with as little intercommunication as 
characterizes the Latin American economy 
at present" . (16) The corollary of this 
insistence on breadth of scope is the advoca-
cy of full application of the most-favoured-
nation clause. In this line of thought, the 
ideal would be, according to some passages 
in CEPAL's studies, a Latin American clause 
with the smallest possible number of excep-
tions. What was envisaged was a Latin 
American preference to be negotiated with-
out a liberalization programme determined 
in detail, which almost necessarily implied a 
product-by-product negotiation. 
T h e exception to the unconditional 
application of the most-favoured-nation 
clause was Central America, at least for the 
t ime being, and the other reservations made 
were those relating to preferential treatment 
for the weaker countries and industrial 
complementarity agreements. 
3. The formula had inevitably to include 
different treatments in accordance with 
the countries' situations4 
C E P A L steadfastly affirmed the necessity of 
preferential treatment for countries in the 
initial stages of development, but later it 
accepted the idea of an intermediate cate-
4"The common market should offer each and all 
of the Latin American countries equal opportunities 
of expediting their economic growth. But the disparities 
gory of countries and even, with reserva-
tions, allowed that some distinction might be 
drawn in respect of those where the level of 
wages was high. It understood the risk of 
concentrating benefits in the more powerful 
or more wide-awake countries. To avoid 
this, two proposals were made: that the 
principle of reciprocity should be establish-
ed, and that differential treatment should be 
granted in accordance with the stage of 
development the countries had reached. 
Reference will be made later to the 
question of reciprocity. As regards differen-
tial treatment, CEPAL began by partly 
following the ideas in vogue and postulating 
as one of its instruments the application of 
different degrees of reduction or elimination 
of duties in the case of the less advanced 
countries, i.e., the possibility that these 
latter might maintain a higher level of 
protection. But it then went on to underline 
the inadequacy of this kind of passive pref-
erential treatment. In practice, the common 
market would mean that the less developed 
countries would have to incur losses deriv-
ing from diversion of trade. To compensate 
them, favourable treatment for their prod-
ucts would not be enough if it was also 
extended to other countries with better 
possibilities of reaping its benefits. The 
solution, according to CEPAL, lay in special 
concessions; "The reduction or elimination 
of duties accorded by a more advanced 
country to one in the initial stages of 
development would not be extended to all 
the other Latin American countries but only 
to those that were less developed. These 
latter would thus be able to benefit by the 
expanding market of the more advanced 
countries without interference from third 
parties". (19) These special concessions 
—i.e., non-reciprocal and exclusive to coun-
tries in thé situation referred to—, which 
in their relative situations consequent upon the varying 
stages of development referred to necessitate differen-
tial treatment if such equality of opportunity in respect 
of the common market is to be ensured so far as 
possible." (5) 
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would be the pivot of the preferential sys-
tem, undoubtedly constituted an innovation 
in the economic integration theories then 
prevailing. 
4. The price mechanism as the basis of the 
operation of the common market 
This is the aspect of the question in which it 
is hardest to discern which were CEPAL's 
original positions, and how far they were 
modified by the progress of negotiations 
which from the very start showed a bias 
towards the so-called principle of 'free 
competition' . CEPAL's theses on differen-
tial treatment according to the situations of 
the various countries, and its views on reci-
procity from the standpoint of setting limits 
to a possible concentration of benefits, 
suggest that if it accepted the principle of 
'free competition' it did so only on condition 
that this principle were complemented by 
corrective mechanisms —i.e., by some kind 
of regulation—, attributing great importance 
to the establishment of such mechanisms as 
might he lp to ensure a measure of equiva-
lence, both quantitative and qualitative 
(type of goods), in trade flows. In this 
connexion it said: "If a country imported 
from other Latin American countries goods 
which it had formerly received from the rest 
of the world, whether it had or had not a 
deficit in its aggregate balance of payments, 
its ability to finance imports with additional 
exports would be a decisive factor in the 
smooth operation of the common market". 
(21) Not just any exports whatever would 
do: " I t is also essential ... that the country 
thus receiving imports of manufactured 
goods should be able to cover them with its 
own exports of industrial products as well as 
of primary commodities".(21) As a system to 
promote reciprocity CEPAL proposed that 
reduction of duties should be stepped up in 
the case of countries with a balance-of-
paymets surplus and slowed down in that of 
countries with a deficit, in addition to which 
the necessary technical and financial assis-
tance should be provided; but it also uttered 
a warning that some mechanism, presum-
ably automatic in character, would also be 
necessary to guarantee that reciprocity was 
really respected in the operation of the 
market.5 It did not propose formulas for this 
mechanism, but on several occasions insist-
ed on the need for it, unfortunately in vain. 
As can be seen, although CEPAL em-
braced, in this context, the 'free competition' 
theses, it did so with fundamental reserva-
tions. Nevertheless, it was more explicit in 
another allied respect, that of the system of 
allocation of resources, no doubt keeping in 
line with the course of the negotiations: 
"The specific solution arrived at after care-
ful analysis is based on the following funda-
mental concept: it would be incumbent 
upon member governments to create condi-
tions conducive to the efficacious action of 
private enterprise within the common mar-
ket ... but it would be private enterprise that 
in the final issue would decide which 
industries were to be established, in which 
countries they were to be installed, and what 
degree of specialization was to be attained". 
(22) These words involve full acceptance of 
the function of the market mechanism in the 
allocation of resources, although with prices 
conditioned by preferential treatment and 
reciprocity; they also have a secondary im-
plication, namely, recognition of the func-
tion of private enterprise in the operation of 
the mechanism in question. In its breadth of 
scope, the main thesis contrasts with the 
position adopted by CEPAL in Central 
America, where from the outset it advocated 
deliberate distribution of certain industries: 
strictly speaking, a sort of programming. The 
real conditions were different, of course, and 
in ALALC's case there was also the factor 
represented by negotiations to which the 
larger countries, and some of the others as 
well, brought the inflexible premise of'free 
5 " T h e pledge of reciprocity alone would perhaps 
not suffice to convince each and every country that 
the risk of damage to its interests would be minimal in 
comparison to the magnitude of the benefits accruing 
from the common market". (22) 
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competition' , a position that left no room for 
the presentation of alternatives. 
5. The major instrument for the creation 
of integration industry consisted in 
complementarity arrangements 
or agreements 
Complementari ty arrangements or agree-
ments are one of the two important excep-
tions to the most-favoured-nation clause 
recognized by CEPAL, the other being 
preferential treatment. Their objective was 
the development of new integrated indus-
tries or the rationalization of the most im-
portant existing activities. The instrument 
envisaged took the form of sharper reduc-
tions of duties and charges than were neces-
sary to reach the average levels in the 
preferential area. 
CEPAL, while noting the risk attaching 
to such arrangements—"were agreements of 
this kind to become very common, they 
might give rise to exclusive groups which in 
the last analysis would hinder the formation 
of the common market"— also drew atten-
tion to their great advantages: this "is an 
exception calculated to promote, rather than 
to militate against, the final objectives of the 
common market".(20) To avoid the risks, it 
suggested, taking up the recommendations 
made by the Working Group, that prior 
approval by the Committee on Trade Policy 
and Payments would be required, and that a 
definite time-limit might be imposed for 
such agreements. CEPAL viewed these 
specialization and complementarity agree-
ments as one of the most efficacious ins-
t ruments for the development of an in-
tegrated industry, and this is the basic 
justification for the exception to the most-
favoured-nation clause —an exception 
which, as several observers noted, undoubt-
edly ran counter to the ideas on integration 
then in vogue. Subsequently, mention was 
made of these reservations, in particular by 
the representatives of the General Agree-
men t on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
United States Government. 
In the present writer's opinion, the 
theses described were the most important of 
those propounded by CEPAL on the subject 
of integration, but from them derive some 
other operational characteristics which 
CEPAL also postulated: 
(a) the proposals for a liberalization 
mechanism based on reduction of duties to 
average levels, under which each country 
could distribute the reductions as suited it 
best, culminated in a system of detailed 
product-by-product negotiations, which 
seemed appropriate because of its greater 
flexibility; 
(b) the efficacy of the instruments for 
safeguarding equity (preferential treatment, 
in particular the special concessions, and the 
provisions relating to reciprocity) depended 
upon the goodwill of the parties, and not 
upon rules laid down when the market was 
established and operating to some extent 
independently of the will of the parties af-
fected, despite CEPAL's aforementioned 
insistence on the necessity for mechanisms 
that would ensure reciprocity, presumably 
more or less automatically; 
(c) from the theses on the function of the 
market mechanism, private enterprise and 
competition (even if restricted), logically 
stemmed those relating to the integration 
organ, which, in such conditions, did not 
need to be invested with any functions but 
those of servicing the negotiations and 
performing a few other administrative and 
regulatory tasks. Where regulation was 
concerned, however, CEPAL attributed to 
this organ much more importance than it was 
accorded by some of the governments, 
which were anxious from the outset to 
reduce its responsibilities to the minimum. 
A propos of the many problems that might 
arise in the course of the negotiations, 
CEPAL asserted: "These problems could be 
gradually settled only at government level. 
Hence the supreme importance both of the 
Committee on Trade Policy and Payments, 
as the agency for these negotiations, and of 
the technical assistance which it would need 
in carrying out its functions".(15) 
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II 
Evolution of ideas during the ALALC negotiations 
The intergovernmental negotiations which 
led to the establishment of ALALC sub-
stantially modified some of the conceptions 
which, as has been shown, were CEPAL's 
theses when it began to promote Latin 
American integration. It is of interest to trace 
the evolution of these concepts, because it 
accounts for the form finally taken by the 
so-called Latin American regional market. 
On the basis of the documents pertain-
ing to the formal meeting,6 the negotiations 
can be divided into two phases whose 
characteristics are pretty clearly defined. 
The process of negotiation really began with 
the first meeting of the Working Group on 
the Latin American Regional Market (1958). 
The first session of CEPAL's Trade Com-
mittee (1956) mainly served the purpose of 
promoting the integration theses at the 
political level, whereas the convening of 
the Working Group made it possible to 
embark upon analysis of the elements of the 
formula, and de facto opened the negotia-
tions, despite the fact that its members were 
participating in their personal capacity. 
Generally speaking, at its two sessions the 
Working Group followed up the theses 
attributed to CEPAL in the preceding 
section. Actually in some cases there was 
undoubtedly interaction between the 
CEPAL secretariat's thinking and that of the 
Working Group, so that it would really be 
arbitrary to define sources. In any event, 
at the Group's two sessions the deliberations 
were based on the above-mentioned concep-
tions, and, in certain respects only, at the 
second session, held early in 1959, the 
Working Group displayed a tendency, 
especially on the part of some of the larger 
countries, to bring the characteristics of the 
formula closer to more exigent integration 
patterns, in line with the definition of the 
6See footnote 1. 
exceptions approved in article 24 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Shortly afterwards this tendency 
was fully revealed at the meetings for 
consultations on trade policy held in April 
1958, in which experts from the southern 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay) took part in a personal capacity, 
and at which a 'draft agreement on a free-
trade area' was drawn up. This draft definite-
ly departed from the gradual, flexible and 
across-the-board approach which had 
prevailed in the Working Group, and pre-
scribed a more exacting formula, which 
adhered more closely to the orthodox tenets 
of classical integration theory. Although at 
the second session of the Trade Committee 
(November 1959) the doubts and apprehen-
sions awakened by this formula were expres-
sed, no reversion to the earlier conception 
took place, and it was the model sketched out 
in the draft that was presented, somewhat 
flexibilized, at the meeting for negotiation at 
the governmental level which were to 
culminate in the treaty establishing a free-
trade area and setting up the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Trea-
ty, 18 February 1960). 
Thus the aforesaid consultations on 
trade policy marked a decisive change of 
course in relation to the conceptions by 
which Latin American integration had 
originally been inspired. 
This brief review of the significant 
moments in the evolution of ideas on 
integration will be followed by an analysis of 
the changes these ideas underwent, in the 
same order as in the preceding section. 
1. More exigent objectives in the 
integration formula 
It has already been noted that CEPAL's 
initial thesis went no farther than the 
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construction of a preferential area. In the 
course of the deliberations, however, the 
objective became more ambitious, until it 
finally took shape in the decision to 'estab-
lish a free-trade area' recorded in article 
1 of the Montevideo Treaty. 
This was the most striking change 
introduced at the aforesaid consultative 
meetings on trade policy. In this connexion, 
there is a marked difference between the 
text of the draft agreement prepared during 
the consultations, and the bases drawn up by 
the Working Group. Article 1 of the draft 
agreement stated: "The Contracting Parties 
hereby establish a free-trade area which 
shall be fully operational within a period not 
longer than ten years from the date on which 
the agreement enters into force". On the 
other hand, among the objectives mentioned 
in the text prepared at the second session of 
the Working Group, specific allusion was 
made to "the establishment of a preferential 
system for trade between Latin American 
countries ".(33) 
Clearly, therefore, it was only during the 
later periods of negotiation, in face of the 
virtual fait accompli represented by the 
agreement among the southern countries, 
that predominance was gained by the free-
trade area proposition, which was finally 
incorporated in the Montevideo Treaty. 
This change was much influenced 
both by the normative system of GATT and 
by the position of the United States, which 
did not fail to drop opportune reminders of 
the advisability of not departing from that 
system. The résumé of the statement made 
by the consultant Edmundo Barbosa da 
Silva, which appears as annex I to the 
summaiy record of the Consultations on 
Trade Policy between the CEPAL secretar-
iat and experts from countries in the south-
ern zone of South America,7 records in 
meticulous detail the analysis of the desir-
Summary record of the Consultations on Trade Policy 
be tween the secretariat of the Commission and 
countries in the southern zone of South America, 
ability of adopting the free-trade area formula 
in order to facilitate its acceptance by GATT, 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, article 24, paragraphs 7 to 10. At the 
second session of the Trade Committee, 
the representative of GATT, after stating that 
he was glad to see "that the views of the 
Latin American countries were very close to 
those held by GATT", remarked that "in 
establishing preferential systems, it was 
necessary to ensure that the interests of third 
countries were not harmed and that such 
systems were only applied at an initial stage, 
since the final aim should always be a 
competitive market without restrictions". 
(123)8 
The Government of the United States 
was still more explicit. At that same meeting 
the United States representative drew atten-
tion to what was, "in his view, the unsatis-
factory nature of the scheme prepared by 
the Working Group. The creation of an 
undetermined level of preference without 
a concrete undertaking to proceed with the 
formation of the free-trade area was likely to 
produce a high degree of uncertainty". 
( 113). Even earlier, in 1958, this unfavoura-
ble opinion had been conveyed by the 
United States Embassy in Rio de Janeiro in 
yet more drastic terms. "The United States 
would gladly see the establishment in Latin 
America of customs unions or free-trade 
areas which satisfy criteria in article XXIV 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade".9 
This shift towards a more exacting 
objective, i.e., a free-trade area instead of 
a preferential area, was unquestionably the 
essential change in the concepts relating to 
the regional liberalization programme, and, 
annex I, quoted in The Latin American Common 
Market, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
'The italics are the present author's. 
' "Comments regarding the attitude of the United 
States towards Latin American common market 
arrangements", reproduced in The Latin American 
Common Market, op. cit., p. 101. 
THE LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL MARKET: THE PROJECT / Germánico Salgado 93 
as w e shall see later, largely accounts for 
what has happened to ALALC. 
T h e other characteristics of the liberal-
ization programme were defined in detail in 
the course ' of the deliberations, but in 
essence CEPAL's original ideas were 
maintained. The programme was to be 
universal in its scope and gradual and 
progressive in its application. The distinc-
tion be tween a first phase with a liberaliza-
tion programme predetermined within 
specific limits, and a second phase covering 
the final construction of a formula for a 
higher degree of integration, either a cus-
toms union or a common market, disappear-
ed in the Montevideo Treaty, which contains 
only a courtesy reference to the subject in 
article 54: "The Contracting Parties shall 
make every effort to direct their policies 
with a view to creating conditions favour-
able to the establishment of a Latin American 
common market". 
T h e first —and in the end the only— 
phase of the liberalization programme was 
extended from the ten years envisaged in 
all previous documents to twelve in the 
Montevideo Treaty. Furthermore, the sub-
stages through which liberalization had to 
pass, as well as the distinction between 
categories of goods and the corresponding 
differences in the reduction of duties that 
appear in the bases prepared by the Working 
Group at its Mexico session, are superseded 
in the Draft Agreement on a Free-Trade 
Area resulting from the Consultations on 
Trade Policy by what is apparently a more 
flexible system, and such concepts are 
formally introduced as 'substantially all 
t rade ' , the 'weighted average' and the 'basic 
schedule ' , which in the Montevideo Treaty 
was to be called the 'Common Schedule'. 
T h e programme and basic concepts of this 
draft were transferred almost unchanged to 
the Montevideo Treaty, which thus incor-
porated the GATT idea of exceptions in 
relation to the free-trade area. 
Certain changes, of form rather than of 
substance, were also effected in the excep-
tions to the application of the most-favoured-
nation clause and in the scope of the escape 
clauses. Generally speaking, if the ideas of 
CEPAL and of the Working Group are taken 
as a starting-point, the predominant ten-
dency was to restrict the scope both of the 
exceptions to the most-favoured-nation 
treatment and of the escape clauses them-
selves. The bases established by the Work-
ing Group acknowledged four exceptions: 
(a) preferential treatment for countries in the 
initial stages of development; (b) comple-
mentarity agreements; (c) existing prefer-
ential concessions whose elimination would 
have to be gradual; and (d) Central American 
countries. 
In the Montevideo Treaty three types of 
exceptions to the most-favoured-nation 
clause are aceepted: frontier trade (article 
19), complementarity agreements (article 
17) and measures in favour of less developed 
countries {chapter VIII). With the elimina-
tion of the exception for the Central Ameri-
can integration movement the seal was set 
on the restrictive character of the regional 
market, the first symptoms of which were 
observable in the southern countries' draft 
agreement on a free-trade area. 
As regards the existence of escape 
clauses, the original ideas were maintained 
in general, although they underwent modi-
fication, especially with respect to applica-
tion procedures, for which in the end more 
extensive faculties were accorded to the 
administrative organ: the Standing Execu-
tive Committee. 
If any general conclusion can be drawn 
from these conceptual trends as to the scope 
and characteristics of the liberalization 
programme, or, in other words, of the 
opening-up of markets in the area, it is that 
during these negotiations the objectives 
became more ambitious and exigent, and 
that the system tended to square more 
exactly with a formal model mainly deter-
mined by the exceptions approved in article 
24 of GATT. The system gained in opera-
tional precision, but lost in breadth and 
flexibility. As will shortly be seen, from the 
time of the Consultations on Trade Policy 
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the idea of a great Latin American regional 
market was relegated to a secondary plane, 
and the formula offered no concrete pos-
sibilities for its construction. These con-
sultations and the aforesaid influence of the 
orthodox tenets of GATT are undoubtedly 
the two determinants of the evolution de-
scribed. 
2. Reduction of the geographical scope of 
the formula 
In the foregoing section mention was made 
of the evolution of the formula towards a 
more restricted country coverage than had 
been originally advocated by CEPAL. This 
seems to have been the result not so much of 
any intention to limit its scope as of the 
formal requirements of the free-trade area 
which, in the end, was the model chosen. 
Influence was also exerted by the haste or 
urgency with which some countries ap-
proached the negotiations, especially the 
countries in the southern zone, which were, 
moreover, very reluctant to recognize sub-
regional agreements, and little disposed to 
welcome preferential treatment or any other 
kinds of exceptions to the most-favoured-
nation clause. 
The CEPAL theses relating to the 
geographical scope of the formula found 
support at the first session of the Working 
Group, but at the second a more rigid 
attitude made its appearance. 
In Basis VII for the Latin American 
Regional Market, established at the session 
in question, the Group still maintained that 
"the common market must include all the 
Latin American countries or the greatest 
possible number of them", but it immediate-
ly acknowledged the possibility that a first 
the common market might have to be 
launched by "an initial group of countries". 
(41) More explicitly, in the "Comments on 
the recommendations", the Group identi-
fied that possible initial nucleus: "The fact 
that the trade of seven countries in the 
southern area makes up about 90% of the 
total trade among Latin American countries 
(petroleum excluded) readily suggests that 
these countries might act as the initial 
nucleus of the common market". (48) This 
particularizing tendency runs parallel to a 
less flexible attitude towards possible sub-
regional groupings. In this latter connexion, 
the Working Group followed the lines laid 
down by CEPAL, which, as has been shown, 
regarded as inadvisable any attempt at 
subregionalization, with the sole exception 
of the Central American integration pro-
gramme. The group considered "that the 
formation of other types of groupings of 
countries, through exclusive arrangements, 
could be an obstacle to the creation of a Latin 
American common market". (48) 
As in other respects, the Draft Agree-
ment on a Free-Trade Area negotiated by the 
four southern countries mentioned above 
constituded a definite divergence from the 
original propositions regarding general ap-
plicability. Although under the provisions of 
article 40 the Agreement was "open to access 
by all Latin American countries" (105), in 
actual fact it represented a manifestation of 
an interest in association confined to part of 
the continent. There were, of course, reasons 
why the group of countries concerned 
wanted to forge the bond of integration as 
quickly as possible; the chief of these was 
the dissolution of bilateral trade arrange-
ments, by which they had been especially 
affected. But apart from that urgent motive, 
underlying this geographical restriction 
there was also a sense of the importance of 
that 'initial nucleus' in which at the time a 
major part of Latin America's trade was 
concentrated. 
Similarly, it is in this Draft Agreement 
that a certain inflexibility towards possible 
subregional groupings is most clearly in evi-
dence, reflecting a greater reluctance to con-
sider any exceptions to the most-favoured-
nation clause — a position which during 
the second session of the Trade Committee 
was still further consolidated, perhaps 
precisely because of the reaction provoked 
by the four southern countries' initiative. 
Criticisms of it, in fact, were combined with 
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expressions of opposition to partial customs 
arrangements on the part of several coun-
tries, including particularly Venezuela and 
Cuba. 
Thenceforward, in the negotiations of 
which the final outcome was the Montevi-
deo Treaty, the objective of across-the-board 
integration for the whole of Latin America 
made no further appearance, except in the 
guise of a ritual enunciation. It was not until 
1967 that references were once again found, 
in the Declaration of the American Chiefs of 
State, to the Latin American scope of integra-
tion and the possibility that programmes 
might converge. The fact is that when 
the Montevideo Treaty was signed, the so-
called 'generality' existed only as sheer 
formulism, and in practice all flexibility for 
the accomodation of subregional move-
ments, including the Central American 
integration programme itself, had been lost. 
Even though article 58 of the Montevideo 
Treaty declared it "open to accession by the 
other Latin American States", it was obvious 
that accession was becoming increasingly 
difficult for the countries of smaller size and 
farther removed from the southern zone of 
South America, which were those principal-
ly remaining outside the free-trade area. 
3. Restriction of the content of the 
preferential system and the key function 
of the special concessions 
The CEPAL theses on differential treatment 
in accordance with the countries' situations 
emerged from the negotiations with changes 
that limited their scope, but left intact their 
essential instrument: the special conces-
sions. It is worth while briefly to trace the 
evolution of ideas in this connexion, as a 
means of assessing the opposition aroused 
by these conceptions from the very start, and 
the actual limitations of the formula adopted. 
The Working Group, at its two sessions, 
developed on broad lines the existing ideas 
on a preferential system. During the second 
session, the Group worked out this system in 
great detail, using, as CEPAL had done, 
three categories of goods and of countries. 
There is no need to describe the bases 
prepared by the Group in this connexion, for 
they faithfully reflect CEPAL's thinking. 
Suffice it to point out that in these bases the 
instruments of preferential treatment are 
already clearly defined: higher average 
levels of protection for those categories of 
products in which development is incipient, 
and non-extensive special concessions, (42) 
which are introduced into the formula as ex-
ceptions to the most-favoured-nation clause, 
and afterwards constituted the basic 
instrument of the preferential system em-
bodied in the Montevideo Treaty. 
The subsequent discussions at the polit-
ical level, however, show how controversial 
the topic continued to be and how superfi-
cial was the grasp of the problem even in the 
interested countries themselves: those of 
incipient development or, in general, the 
weaker countries. Surprisingly, in the light 
of our present appraisal of the integration 
phenomenon, the southern countries' Draft 
Agreement on a Free-Trade Area included 
no preferential system. It should be recalled 
that among the possible signatories of this 
draft were Chile and Uruguay, together with 
Brazil and Argentina, and that the first two 
were later to request preferential status 
within ALALC. 
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, 
that some of the elements of the system 
envisaged by CEPAL were not incorporated 
in the Montevideo Treaty. Thus, no advan-
tages were accorded to the middle category 
of countries —those whose markets were 
insufficient— nor was a preference included 
which took the form of greater protection for 
those categories of products in which devel-
opment was incipient in the beneficiary 
country. In reality, the Treaty established no 
distinctions between goods, and therefore 
left the level of protection entirely to the 
mercy of negotiations between the parties. 
Nevertheless, as was stated earlier, the 
most important instrument of the CEPAL 
propositions stood its ground: namely, the 
special concessions, which became virtually 
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the only preferences adopted in the Monte-
video Treaty. Although article 32 also em-
powered the Contracting Parties to accord 
the relatively less developed countries a 
higher level of protection, as well as other 
advantages, in practice the system was 
centred on the special concessions, partly 
because the very stagnation of the liberaliza-
tion programme detracted from the ef-
fectiveness of the passive preferences based 
on the existence of differing rates of reduc-
tion of duties in different countries. 
In view of the spirit in which the 
participants signed the Treaty, however, it is 
significant that the distinction originally 
established by CEPAL between categories 
of products should have been eliminated, 
because it would have been the factual and 
predetermined element (not dependent 
upon product-by-product negotiations) in 
the application of these passive preferences. 
T h e distinction between products disap-
peared when the formula changed its objec-
tive from a preferential area to a free-trade 
area. For the reasons given, the fact was of no 
great practical importance, but it reveals an 
unwill ingness to acknowledge differences 
be tween countries, which was most clearly 
evidenced in the suppression of the middle 
category referred to above. 
The instrument that finally remained 
—the special concessions— was the element 
that CEPAL considered essential if integra-
tion was to function equitably. I t also 
constituted the authentic innovation in ideas 
on differential treatment. Despite the muti-
lations suffered by the system that CEPAL 
had proposed, its essence was respected, so 
that any criticisms that may be levelled at the 
validity of the preferential system establish-
e d in the Montevideo Treaty are also 
fundamentally applicable to CEPAL's ideas 
on the subject, and, therefore, to the predom-
inant conceptions, to the so-called 'state of 
the arts', with respect to integration. When 
this topic is reverted to later on, a reminder 
will be given of some of the characteristics of 
the outlook in question, which was also 
reflected in CEPAL's opinion on negotia-
tions in a framework of free competition, and 
the acceptance of qualitative differences 
—among others— between the industrial 
specialization of the countries of incipient 
development and that of the more advanced 
countries. 
4. Subjection of the opening-up of markets 
to the principle of free competition, and 
the function of the price mechanism 
The period in which the theses on Latin 
American integration were gradually matur-
ing coincided with region-wide criticisms of 
the efficacy of the market mechanism in face 
of economic development requirements, 
and with efforts on the part of almost all gov-
ernments to set national planning systems in 
motion. Yet the negotiations on economic 
integration were conducted with the most 
scrupulous respect for the liberal theses on 
the virtues of the 'invisible hand' of the 
market, free competition and the role of 
private enterprise in economic integration. 
One of the reasons for this ambivalence 
was undoubtedly the vigour with which the 
larger Latin American countries advocated 
such theses as basic principles of the 
integration in which they were interested; 
from the outset these tenets were propound-
ed as if they were authentic political condi-
tions for initiating negotiations that would 
have any prospects of materializing. More-
over, the existing theoretical models for 
economic integration—of which the Treaty 
of Rome seemed to be the most important 
application— were all based on liberaliza-
tion processes which were founded on those 
same principles. Whether to serve national 
interests or from genuine conviction, the fact 
of the matter is that in all documents prior to 
the Montevideo Treaty the propositions in 
question are repeatedly stated as guiding 
principles for the so-called Latin American 
regional market. The only corrective of'free' 
competition allowed was the preferential 
system for the relatively less developed 
countries, since CEPAL's ideas of imposing 
limitations on the price system to ensure 
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reciprocity met with no response among the 
negotiating parties. 
As from the time of the earliest docu-
men t prepared with the participation of 
national experts, i.e., the report of the first 
session of the Working Group, respect for the 
market mechanism and the function of 
private enterprise are brought into promi-
nence as basic principles. The most categori-
cal declaration on this point is to be found in 
Base V: "The specialization in industries 
and other activities which is one of the 
objectives of the regional market must be the 
outcome of the free interplay of economic 
forces..." " I t is inconsistent with this princi-
p le to accord specific countries the exclusive 
right to install certain industries or activities, 
or to impose restrictions on free competition, 
except as regards the special features of the 
integration programme of the Central Ameri-
can countries, which in this context must be 
considered as a single unit...". (31) This 
really implied a veto not only on any kind of 
programming of activities in the new area 
but even on any negotiation explicitly con-
cerned with the allocation of industries, such 
as was then already being discussed by the 
Central American countries, and CEPAL 
itself, in relation to the so-called integration 
industries. 
Some of the comments on the thesis 
stated above clarify its meaning still further: 
specialization "should come about as the 
result of the free interplay of interests, which 
is not incompatible with effective guidance 
through financial agencies. But in no case 
should it lead to exclusive arrangements 
which prevent competition or the entry of 
n e w enterprises". (33) Guidance was con-
sidered allowable through financing, but on 
no account through instruments that would 
intervene in the opening-up of markets, i.e., 
those proper to the integration process. 
T h e logical corollary of this attitude is 
the conception of the central —theoretically 
indeed unique, to judge from the terms 
employed— position of private enterprise in 
economic integration. The report of the 
Working Group itself, in explaining the 
criterion adopted for the purposes of com-
plying with the mandate to draft the bases for 
the regional market, declares: "In formu-
lating them, the Group has been guided first 
and foremost by the idea that such bases will 
be effective only in so far as they offer ample 
opportunities to private enterprise and its 
achievements. The governments will plan 
the structure of the regional market, but it 
will be for private enterprise to give it life..." 
(30) As in the case of the emphasis laid on 
respect for the market mechanism, this ap-
ologia for the function of private enterprise 
is probably dictated less by ideological 
motivations than by the interests of the 
countries whose private entreprise is more 
powerful and dynamic. 
Both the report of the second session of 
the Working Group and the southern coun-
tries' Draft Agreement on the Free-Trade 
Area omitted all reference to these princi-
ples, although they structured in some detail 
an integration system entirely based on 
them. The topic is dealt with explicitly only 
in one of the annexes to the report of the 
Consultations on Trade Policy, which con-
tains a memorandum from the United States 
Embassy in Rio de Janeiro; it declares that 
the support of the United States for preferen-
tial arrangements would depend upon 
whether they "would promote the efficient 
allocation of resources on a competitive 
basis..." (102) Well-known, moreover, is the 
steadfast opposition of the United States 
Government to the system of integration 
industries in the Central American Common 
Market, on the grounds that exclusive ar-
rangements were thus established which 
interfered with free competition.10 Un-
doubtedly, during this phase of the negotia-
tions the official statements of the United 
States Government were invoked as power-
ful arguments in favour of the foregoing 
theses, and, as was remarked above, in 
support of the free-trade area formula. 
10Constantine V. Vaitsos, Crisis in regional econom-
ic co-operation (integration) among developing coun-
tries, in typescript, p. 25 et seq. 
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With the progress of the negotiations 
that culminated in the Montevideo Treaty, 
the principle of competitiveness and the 
importance of private enterprise gradually 
became virtually undisputed postulates, ac-
ceptance of which was taken for granted. 
Thus, in all the documents that repro-
duce the results of the deliberations and, 
sometimes, the positions of governments or 
national experts, only on one occasion is a 
definite reservation expressed with respect 
to the virtues of the market mechanism and, 
in general, the desirability of the above-
ment ioned principles. It appears in the 
report of the second session of the Trade 
Committee, and forms part of a declaration 
made by the representative of Bolivia in 
relation to resolution 6 (II), to the effect "that 
the basic requisite for an effective common 
market was equality among member coun-
tries, so that equilibrium among their econo-
mies could be Created and maintained. Free 
trade tended to aggravate the disparity 
be tween the more and less privileged 
countries", since "the latter found them-
selves compelled to offer their goods at 
abnormally low prices". (134) 
The other original characteristics of the 
formula underwent no substantial change in 
the course of the negotiations. The concept 
of complementarity agreements or arrange-
ments as a basic instrument of integration 
industry was maintained. As already pointed 
out, the Working Group approved this 
exception to the most-favoured-nation 
clause, formally limiting its duration and 
establishing the need for prior authorization 
by the Committee on Trade Policy and 
Payments . The southern countries' Draft 
Agreement on a Free-Trade Area, in article 
15, sanctioned such arrangements, even in 
cases where they associated a Contracting 
Party with third countries in Latin America, 
always provided that they were negotiated 
through the Committee. (103) Articles 16 
and 17 of the Montevideo Treaty reproduced 
the essence of the original ideas on the 
subject, declared that the agreements were 
open to the accession of the Contracting 
Parties, and established a posteriori authori-
zation via the expedient of a decision that 
they were consistent with the principles and 
purposes of the Treaty. Neither in this 
Treaty nor in the Draft Agreement are 
deadlines set, since they became needless 
when the objective was changed from a 
preferential area to a free-trade area." 
In the last analysis, the exception re-
tained all its importance. Theoretically the 
possibility was open to all, and especially to 
the relatively less developed countries, 
which, in accordande with subsequent re-
forms, could take advantage of the agree-
ments without negotiating their accession. 
In practice, such arrangements were made in 
respect of fairly large-scale industries in 
which decisive importance attached to the 
bargaining capacity of the bigger countries at 
more advanced stages of industrial develop-
ment. Their existence, in a setting in which 
competition was a basic principle, combined 
with the above-mentioned limitations im-
posed on preferential treatment, heavily 
weighted the scales in favour of those more 
powerful countries. 
As regards the functional characteristics 
of the market —largely a corollary of the 
theses which finally prevailed in the formu-
la, especially those relating to the principle 
of "competition" as the supreme operational 
norm—,the negotiations tended to repudia-
ate automatic mechanisms and as far as 
possible to prevent regulatory action on the 
part of the integration organs. Specifically, in 
order to preclude anything resembling com-
munal influence in the basic integration 
decisions, the successive texts in which the 
results of the negotiations were embodied 
said nothing of what the CEPAL secretariat 
had asked for as a means of ensuring that 
reciprocity really worked in practice. In the 
same spirit, the system for opening up the 
market was also retained intact, and in view 
Except for the very remote possibility that 
products covered by such agreements might be excluded 
from the corresponding schedules under the liberal-
ization programme. 
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of the characteristics of the formula, took the 
shape of product-by-product negotiations. 
In both cases, the absence of com-
mitments allowing a measure of automatism 
left the entire functioning of the integration 
process, down to its smallest details, depen-
dent upon government decisions and, there-
fore, upon a continuous quest for a consen-
sus which presupposed a permanent spirit of 
goodwill in the Contracting Parties. Further-
more, the possibility of communal action 
accorded to the integration organs, both 
those of a governmental character and, in 
particular, the CEPAL secretariat, was slight 
or non-existent. This attitude is clearly 
reflected in the wording of the Working 
Group's comments, at its second session, on 
the subject of "Measures to remedy balance-
of-payments disequilibrium". With reference 
ce to the position of a country with a surplus, 
it said: "In that event, the Committee should 
advise it to adopt further liberalization 
measures so that, through the resultant 
increase in its imports, it can help the debtor 
countries in their development'\(50)12 It 
was obvious that in this and other matters the 
predominant aim at least was to avoid as far 
as possible rules involving a principle of 
automatism — a position which was fully 
maintained in the Montevideo Treaty. 
The passages relating to the integration 
organs are equally revealing. In a comment 
on Basis XI, formulated at the first session of 
the Working Group and entitled "The 
advisory body", the Group textually states 
that it "does not consider that the Latin 
American countries are yet ready to establish 
at the outset an executive authority for the 
regional market, although this might consti-
tute an objective for the future. Accordingly, 
it would prefer an organization of an adviso-
ry type..." (34) The function of this advisory 
1 2 The italics are the present author's. 
body in controversial cases is then clarified, 
although even in such circumstances its 
opinion would be sought only as a first step 
"so that the country which considers itself 
prejudiced by measures taken by other 
countries may apply for a ruling". (34)13 
This version of the characteristics of the 
highest integration organ was so colourless 
that the Working Group itself, at its second 
session, had to go farther. Basis XI stipulates: 
"For the purpose of administering the agree-
ment and facilitating the attainment of its 
ends, a Committee on Trade Policy and 
Payments composed of representatives of all 
the member countries will be set up to carry 
out the negotiations arising from the agree-
ment". (42) Thus the Committee was given 
the character of an administrative organ and 
a forum for negotiations, although its action 
was still kept within as narrow bounds as 
possible. 
The forms of organization which were 
finally established in the Montevideo Treaty 
were not without a precedent in the southern 
countries' Draft Agreement on a Free-Trade 
Area. This draft included provisions relating 
both to the Committee, which was to be a 
permanent body, and to an executive secre-
tariat; in its article 28 it specified the 
functions of the Committee, which corre-
sponded in essence to those of a forum for 
negotiations and an administrative organ. 
There were no signs of a regulatory, much 
less a planning, function, and the projected 
executive secretariat lacked any possibility 
of acting on its own initiative, although the 
Committee was allowed a certain amount of 
latitude as regards adopting decisions on 
some matters,14 which was maintained, al-
though in an attenuated form, in the Monte-
video Treaty. 
1 3 The italics are the present author's. 
1 4For example, the possibility of temporarily 
exempting less developed countries from obligations in 
respect of reciprocity. 
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III 
Integration movements in the developing world and 
their principal problems 
Apart from the intrinsic importance of these 
efforts as an example of Latin American co-
operation in whose gestation CEPAL's in-
fluence played a decisive part, analysis of 
the evolution of those ideas which finally 
took concrete shape in ALALC is of interest 
as an aid in understanding the characteristics 
of the integration patterns that saw the light 
in the developing world during the 1960s. 
Chronologically, ALALC, set up in 
February 1960, was the first integration 
formula devised by developing countries. 
The East African Community dates back 
even earlier, following on from colonial 
times, but only in June 1967 did an agree-
ment emerge which emanated entirely from 
motivations on the part of self-governing 
countries. The chronological precedence of 
ALALC does not mean that it influenced the 
characteristics of the other integration move-
ment either in the American continent or in 
Asia and Africa, but it does indicate the 
tendencies then prevailing. Its features 
constituted the first manifestation in the 
developing world of a conception of econom-
ic integration which had stemmed not only 
from the specific example of the Treaty of 
Rome and from the GATT regulations, but 
also from the views predominant in interna-
tional economic theory and, more specifical-
ly, in what was known as customs-union 
theory. 
For reasons linked more to negotiation 
proceedings than to concepts, ALALC was 
also a sort of extremely simplified model of 
integration based on competition. But some 
of its central characteristics tended to be 
reproduced in the other programmes; only in 
1969, with the creation of the Andean Group, 
was there a definite split in basic principles. 
These affinities between the conceptual 
origins of integration formulas are, accord-
ingly, very useful for the purposes of a 
critical appraisal of the objectives and instru-
ments chosen, since such a critique would 
not be grounded on ALALC's experience 
alone, but on everything that has been done 
in this connexion in the developing world 
since 1960, with the consequent consider-
able enrichment of the field of observation. 
In the light of these considerations, the 
present paper will contain no description of 
what has happened in each of the Latin 
American integration movements,15 but an 
attempt will be made at a generalized 
statement of the principal problems they 
have encountered, with the intention of 
examining the causes of these difficulties 
and acquiring a better knowledge of the 
elements that influence the viability of 
integration. Only then, in the writer's opi-
nion, will it be possible to arrive at a critical 
view of those conceptions, whose manifesta-
tions in ALALC have been enumerated in 
sections I and II of the present article. 
A list is given below of the integration 
groupings in the developing world which 
have been studied for the above-mentioned 
purposes, in the chronological order of their 
establishment and with a note of the acro-
nym by which they are most commonly 
known. The list comprises only those organ-
izations whose objectives include integra-
tion of markets in any of its forms. 
1 5The author gives such a description in an article 
on viable integration and the problems of economic 
integration in the developing world, which will shortly 
be published by the United Nations in its Journal of 
Development Planning. For a more detailed analysis, 
see Havelock Brewster, Current Problems of Economic 
Integration: Agricultural and Insutrial Co-operation 
among Developing Countries, United Nations publica-
tion, Sales N." 72.II.D.6; Peter Hobson, Economic 
Integration in Africa, London, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1968; Arthur Hazlewood, Economic 
Integration: The East African Experience, London 
(also Nairobi, Ibadan, Lusaka), Heinemann, 1975, 
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Latin American Free-
Trade Association 
(ALALC) February 1960 
Central American 
Common Market (MCCA), 
with its immediate 
antecedents in the 
Multilateral Treaty 
signed in 1958 December 1960 
Arab Economic Unity 
Council (CAEU), within 
which four States have 
acceeded to the Arab 
Common Market in force 
since 1971 April 1964 
Central African Customs 
and Economic Union 
(UDEAC), with a new 
Treaty signed in 1974 
and in force since 1975 January 1966 
East African Community 
(EAC), whose antecedents 
date back to 1917, with 
the establishment of a 
customs union between 
Kenya and Uganda June 1967 
Caribbean Free-Trade 
Association (CARIFTA), 
which became the 
Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) in 1973 May 1968 
East Caribbean Common 
Market (MCCO), a 
subregional grouping within 
CARICOM June 1968 
Andean Group (subregional 
grouping within the Latin 
American Free-Trade 
Association) May 1969 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS) May 1975 
As already noted, the list does not 
include those groupings of States whose 
constitutive treaties do not establish econom-
ic integration mechanisms, such as the 
Council of the Entente States and the 
Maghreb Permanent Consultative Commit-
tee in Africa, the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia, and the 
Regional Co-operation for Development 
Organization formed by Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey. Nor do any appear in the list which 
although they had intended to set up such 
mechanisms were unable to put them into 
effect, as is the case with the African and 
Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) or 
the West African Economic Community 
(CEAO).16 
Without going into details, it may be 
asserted that today the situation of the great 
majority of such integration movements is 
discouraging. Only two of them are operat-
ing with political vitality and in conformity 
with their constitutive provisions. These are 
the Andean Group and the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Of these, ECOWAS established its secretar-
iat less than two years ago, and the first com-
itment relating to the opening-up of the 
market (the tariff statu quo clause) was to be 
brought into application in January 1978; the 
movement has begun with resoluteness and 
political will, but it is in an initial phase 
which precludes comparison of its develop-
ment with that of other programmes. The 
Andean Group set up its secretariat in 1970, 
and its principal mechanisms, including the 
opening-up of markets, are in operation, 
despite sporadic failures to comply with 
requirements; it has not been free from 
crises, however, among them that which 
culminated with the withdrawal of one of the 
members of the Group, namely, Chile. This 
conflict, in addition to negotiation difficul-
ties, kept it virtually in a state of stagnation 
from 1975 to September 1977, in which year 
it managed to struggle out of the morass, 
thereby becoming the only integration pro-
gramme among developing countries with a 
few years of existence behind it which has 
maintained its dynamism; a situation that 
certainly gives food for serious thought. 
See the annex tor the list of countries members 
of the groupings mentioned, with some basic data on 
population and product. 
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Of the rest, the East African Communi-
ty, the oldest of the integration movements if 
one looks back to its antecedents in colonial 
t imes, is on the point of dissolution, follow-
ing the collapse of its common services in 
1977 and the closing of the frontiers between 
some of its member countries. The Carib-
bean Community seems to be sunk in a 
profound crisis which may endanger its very 
existence, as well as the future of the East 
Caribbean Common Market. The Latin 
American Free-Trade Association and the 
Central American Common Market are at a 
standstill, and their legal instruments need a 
thorough overhauling which has been defer-
red up to now. The Central African Customs 
and Economic Union (UDEAC) is still 
formally extant, but limitations on the open-
ing-up of markets and instances of non-
compliance with its provisions have detract-
ed from its vitality as an integration system. 
And, lasdy, the Arab Economic Unity Coun-
cil may be considered an association of 
States for economic co-operation, but not an 
authentic market integration movement. In 
practice, most of the provisions agreed upon 
are not complied with, and the Arab Com-
mon Market is in its initial phase, without 
much prospect of materializing. Despite the 
obvious potentialities of this movement as 
regards the execution of multinational pro-
jects of interest to two or more member 
States, hitherto integration objectives have 
not been viable. 
In short, with the exception of the 
Andean Group and the nascent ECOWAS, 
all the other integration groupings in the 
developing world today are in a state of 
stagnation and conflict —which in this case 
is almost invariably tantamount to regres-
sion— or have deviated from their objectives 
and can no longer be viewed as integration 
programmes. One of them, as already point-
ed out, has entirely ceased to function and is 
running the risk of final disruption, which is 
all the more regrettable inasmuch as it was 
one of the oldest and the most effectively 
articulated. Such a balance-sheet is bound to 
be a motive of concern for all those who have 
the development of the Third World at heart. 
The attention of specialists in the subject has 
long been engaged by the theory of econom-
ic integration and the analysis of its 
possible effects. Integration instruments 
have been the object of meticulous examina-
tion and pertinent recommendations abound 
in the literature of the speciality. The real-
life experience of integration programmes, 
however, has left behind it a trail of conflicts 
and failures which are in contrast with the 
faraway optimism of scientific lucubrations 
on this topic. 
Observation of the vicissitudes under-
gone by these groupings shows remarkable 
coincidences. With variants arising out of the 
special circumstances of each programme, 
there is a pattern that prevails in every case. 
Accordingly, with the inevitable simplifica-
tions, it is possible to pinpoint a set of basic 
problems, to outline which, as an initial 
hypothesis, is the aim of these pages. 
In accordance with a definition based 
more on the origin of the problems than on 
the forms they take, the principal conflicts 
besetting the integration movements of 
developing countries can be summed up as 
follows: 
(i) incompatibility of political systems 
with integration in general or with the 
mechanisms chosen to achieve it; 
(ii) problems of political relations be-
tween the States, often with territorial 
(geopolitical) connotations; 
(iii) differences between member coun-
tries in respect of the industrial develop-
ment attained, and their potential or capacity 
for such development, a problem which 
manifests itself chiefly in the dissatisfaction 
of some of these countries with the distribu-
tion of the costs and benefits of integration; 
(iv) other differences in economic struc-
ture between the member countries, which 
affect the operation and therefore the objec-
tives of the integration mechanisms. 
As can be seen, of the conflicts listed the 
first two are of a primarily political character; 
when they are present, integration lacks a 
favourable political framework and its eco-
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nomic implications are largely irrelevant. 
The other two problems are directly related 
to the economic motivations of integration 
and the operation of its mechanisms, and it is 
therefore principally to these that we shall 
devote attention in the following pages, 
although not without first briefly defining 
the scope of the two political problems. 
1. Incompatibility of political systems 
The two cases in which this sort of conflict 
has definitely arisen17 clearly illustrate its 
nature and seriousness. In the Andean 
Group, Chile's position in opting for integra-
tion with the world market as the final 
objective of its economic policy created an 
essential incompatibility with the spatially 
limited integration of the Andean Group. 
The conflict concerning the level of the 
Common External Tariff is one expression of 
this incompatibility. In default of a change in 
the original positions, the only solution for 
the problem was the one finally adopted: the 
withdrawal of Chile. 
In the other case, that of the problems 
caused by State trading in the East African 
Community, the incongruity between politi-
cal systems seems less obvious because, in 
the end, both Tanzania on the one hand and 
Kenya and Uganda on the other resorted to 
State trading organizations which in a 
greater or a lesser degree interfered with the 
tariff liberalization mechanisms which the 
Treaty used as its principal instrument. 
Strictly speaking, however, it was Tanzania, 
a socialist country, with its State Trading 
Corporation, that began to segregate pro-
ducts which were reserved for State trading, 
especially where imports were concerned. 
With the contemporary nationalization of 
enterprises, the list grew longer, and the 
STC was divided into several corporations, 
1 7 The position as between CARICOM and Guyana 
is not taken into account because, according to the 
information available, there is no record of incompati-
bility be tween mechanisms, although ideological di-
vergences do exist. 
many of which, besides being producers, 
held a monopoly of imports of the corre-
sponding products.18 Inevitably, the other 
countries saw in this kind of organization a 
means of evading considerations of costs and 
prices and illegitimately restricting imports. 
Largely as a reprisal, Kenya set up its 
National Trading Corporation, and Uganda 
followed suit. 
Apart from the special features of each 
case, it is of importance to single out the form 
of incompatibility that may emerge in inte-
gration programmes combining countries 
with market economies—i.e., sovereingty of 
the consumer and allocation of resources 
through the price mechanism— and socialist 
countries, characterized by planning of 
foreign trade and monopolistic State trading 
of most of their production, in particular 
imports and exports. None of the usual 
systems for making markets more open can 
function in such conditions: in the socialist 
country the reduction or elimination of tariff 
duties is basically ineffectual as an induce-
ment to buy and, conversely, if the opening-
up system is based on the planning of trade, 
the country with a market economy has no 
instruments for really complying with the 
stipulations of the programme. This function-
al incompatibility of systems differs from 
the case first stated —incompatibility with 
free trade à l'outrance— inasmuch as there 
the very motivation for integration is lack-
ing, which is not a necessary assumption in 
respect of the functional incompatibility 
described. 
Essential incompatibility was exempli-
fied in its unadulterated forms in the Andean 
Group; functional incompatibility appeared, 
with its outlines somewhat blurred by the 
weight of other problems, in the East African 
Community. At least as an ideological 
discrepancy, it would also seem to be 
present in CARICOM. In a world of mixed 
economies like that of the developing coun-
tries, what is most probable is that this 
See Arthur Hazlewood, op. cit., pp. 124 and 131. 
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contradiction will not occur in pure forms, 
but through fragmentary and limited inter-
ventions by State enterprises which restrict 
certain trade flows. Possibly, too, in conse-
quence of the course of history, or other 
causes that determine an economic structure, 
the sphere of action of State enterprises 
may vary greatly among member countries; 
in that case, instead of incompatibility of 
political systems, structural differences 
would be a more accurate term: heterogenei-
ties that affect the scope and instruments of 
integration. This problem falls into a differ-
ent category, which will be dealt with later 
under the head of "Other differences in 
economic structure". 
2. Conflicts in political relations 
between member States 
This broad heading covers all sorts of 
conflicts between members States that are 
brougtht about by causes alien to economic 
integration. It is easy to understand that such 
situations, when they are sufficiently se-
rious, wipe out the very possibility of 
integration. This is what has happened in the 
case of Honduras after its conflict with El 
Salvador, in the Central American Common 
Market. Even the mere existence of tense 
situations in inter-State relationships has 
repercussions on integration. Suffice it to 
recall the effect on the fortunes of the East 
African Community produced by the impos-
sibility of convening its maximum organ, the 
East African Authority, formed by the Chiefs 
of State, owing to the refusal of President 
Nierere of Tanzania to meet Idi Amin of 
Uganda. 
Problems of this kind can arise in almost 
all integration movements in the developing 
countries. The countries concerned are 
physically adjacent, often with territorial or 
other disputes in their history, and have 
been incited to seek integration, inter alia, 
by their desire to find ways of improving 
their relationships and their possibilities of 
resolving such problems. But for that very 
reason, these efforts are extremely sensitive 
to the general tone of inter-State relation-
ships. 
3. Differences between member countries 
in respect of the degree of industrial 
development attained and their capacity 
for such development 
It is almost a commonplace to say that one of 
the most frequent causes of conflicts in 
integration among developing countries is 
the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
integration. Customs union theory measures 
this distribution in terms of creation and 
diversion of trade, but in reality the decisive 
element in the political evaluation of its 
results is the extent to which countries 
participate in the siting of the new industries 
which integration makes possible. 
Industrial development is the funda-
mental incentive to integration among de-
veloping countries. The political evaluation 
of benefits tends to be based, in the first 
place, on the degree to which the integration 
formula effectively permits such develop-
ment, in particular the installation of new 
integration industries, and, secondly, on 
comparison of the results obtained by each of 
the countries participating in the integra-
tion programme. The evaluation may also be 
influenced by the expansion and balance 
of trade flows, since the desire to increase 
them is another motive for integration. 
However, at least in the earliest stages of 
integration movements, this consideration 
seems to come second to participation in 
integration industry. It should be noted that 
even the oldest integration formulas in the 
developing world are still in those initial 
phases in which the aim is to construct a 
different industrial base, taking advantage of 
the new economic space available. Conse-
quently, the mere volume of trade flows is 
not usually of central importance for the 
purposes of evaluation; on the contrary, 
more account is taken of the proportion of 
traditional and new (almost always manufac-
tured) products in those flows, which re-
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fleets the impact of the industrial develop-
ment induced by integration. 
Dissatisfaction with the results largely 
explains the sluggishness of the Latin Amer-
ican Free-Trade Association; the conflicts 
and what may, up to a point, be considered 
the regression of the Central American 
Common Market; the disruption, which has 
every appearance of being final, of the East 
African Community; the stagnation of the 
Central African Customs and Economic 
Union; and, to a great extent, the current 
problems of the Caribbean Community. And 
even the difficult period through which the 
Andean Group has passed may be attributed 
above all to the stumbling-blocks met with in 
the negotiation of the industrial pro-
grammes. 
The fact that does most to account for 
this dissatisfaction is the existence in the 
groupings concerned of marked disparities 
between member countries in the degree of 
industrial development attained or, at least, 
in their capacity to serve as a basis for 
integration industry. In all of them some 
countries stand out as those with the greatest 
potentialities. Within the East African Com-
munity, the supremacy of Kenya has been 
the apple of discord in its principal con-
flicts. In the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union, the country best endowed 
and in the most advantageous situation for 
industrial development iz Cameroon; in the 
Latin American Free-Trade Association the 
corresponding position is occupied by Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Mexico, the three largest 
countries; in the Central American Common 
Market, by Guatemala and El Salvador; in 
the Caribbean Community, by Trinidad and 
Tobago and all the bigger islands, over 
agains the less developed countries grouped 
in the East Caribbean Common Market; 
and in the Andean Group, Colombia and 
Venezuela are outstanding. 
The dominant position in each group-
ing does not necessarily correspond to a 
country's superior economic size or appre-
ciably higher per capita income. (See annex.) 
What matters is the degree of industrial de-
velopment attained, inasmuch as it implies 
greater capacity to take advantage of the 
benefits of integration in this field —a 
characteristic which is displayed in the 
volume and composition of trade with the 
other members of the grouping— and also 
the way in which some of the member 
countries perceive the advantages over them 
that others may enjoy by virtue both of their 
resources and of their policies. 
To sum up, if one tries to get to the 
bottom of the problem, the major source of 
conflicts in integration among developing 
countries appears to be the heterogeneity of 
the countries affiliated to such groupings in 
respect of the industrial development 
achieved and the capacity to exploit the 
opportunities offered by integration indus-
try. This is no new pronouncement, since it 
figures in all the analyses relating to specific 
situations in integration movements. What is 
surprising is that its significance has not 
been recognized in an integration theory 
which, obviously, has overlooked the fact 
that in the developing world heterogeneity 
may be much more marked than among 
industrialized countries, and that it is preg-
nant with real or psychological implications 
for integration prospects and instruments. 
As far as can be seen, this heterogeneity 
influences integration in two ways. In the 
first place, as has already been remarked, it 
induces mistrust on the part of the weaker 
countries (an ex ante attitude) or dissatis-
faction at the distribution of benefits (an ex 
post attitude). These two reactions together 
tend to limit the scope of integration and 
even, as has been shown, to set it back. But 
that is not the only way in which hetero-
geneity can affect integration. It may be 
assumed that, ceteris paribus, the motiva-
tions19 for integration will differ in intensity 
l 9 The writer is conscious of the simplification 
implied by a concept of collective motivations in deal-
ing with such phenomena as integration, which affect 
different social groups in different ways. In the present 
case, however, this simplification is useful as a method-
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as between a country with a relatively large 
domestic market and other conditions fa-
vourable for industrialization, and another 
with a smaller domestic market, less indus-
trial tradition and, in general, inferior capac-
ity for industrial development, however this 
is measured. The second may reason-
ably be expected to have stronger incentives 
to seek thoroughgoing forms of integration. 
The two countries will pursue different 
integration objectives, and the mechanisms 
they prefer will be different likewise. Their 
participation in the same integration formula 
will result in a tendency either to reduce the 
scope of the objectives and weaken the 
mechanisms —when the opinion of the 
larger and more industrially advanced coun-
try, which is usually the one with superior 
bargaining capacity, carries the day—, or to 
concert integration objectives and patterns 
which will subsequently prove non-viable 
in their full depth. 
The first situation occurred in the case of 
ALALC, where the more powerful countries 
managed to exclude any system which might 
effectively give an opportunity to the weaker 
countries in integration industry. The result 
was, as has been stated, continual dissatis-
faction on the part of the latter and, in the 
end, the stagnation of the process. The 
second situation —a formula with ambitious 
but non-viable objectives— seems to be that 
of the Arab Economic Unity Council, which 
embraces an extremely heterogeneous set of 
countries. 
In considering the influence of the dif-
ferences in capacity for industrial develop-
ment and in intensity of motivations for 
integration which probably go hand in hand 
with the aforesaid heterogeneity, some 
thought may also be given to another factor: 
the economic size of the integration area, or, 
more exactly, how far its dimensions as a 
ological recourse, since little would be gained by 
extending the analysis at this stage to the complexities 
of the social and political process of gestation and 
expression of such motivations. 
market will permit of the change in indus-
trial structure which it is hoped will be 
achieved through integration. In integration 
areas of small economic dimensions the 
motivations in question are less strong, 
especially in the case of those countries 
participating in the programme whose ca-
pacity for industrial development is greatest. 
In addition to other economic effects —such 
as the steadily increasing dependence on 
imports of industrial raw materials and 
intermediate products from third countries 
which is observable, for example, in 
CARICOM—, the small size of the expanded 
market may undoubtedly contribute per se to 
aggravate the discontent and discordance 
about objectives and mechanisms. Ceteris 
paribus, a larger integration area would be 
less liable to conflicts of this kind. 
Without attempting to carry this analysis 
farther, it may be asserted that the disparity 
in industrial development and in potentiali-
ties for it, the particular combination of 
countries participating in each integration 
formula, and the possibilities afforded by the 
new space, particularly in terms of its 
economic size, join in creating situations 
either more or less favourable to integration 
and to the application of the various instru-
mental alternatives for conducting the mar-
ket integration process. These are aspects of 
the problem which have been mainly over-
looked, and to which integration theory will 
have to give due weight in the future. 
From the standpoint of integration pol-
icies, only one of these phenomena stem-
ming from the heterogeneity of the affiliated 
countries has been especially taken into 
account in the selection of integration 
mechanisms: namely, the tendency towards 
concentration of the benefits of integration, 
especially industrial development, in the 
economically more advanced and more 
powerful countries. 
In all the integration formulas studied, 
an attempt has been made to establish treat-
ments in favour of the weaker countries 
which will help to offset their disadvantages 
in the integration process. Cases in point are 
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afforded by ALALC's special lists of non-
reciprocal concessions and the 'transfer tax' 
of the East African Community. In Africa in 
particular, compensation has also been 
sought through redistribution of customs or 
tax revenue; in addition, some of the 
groupings expressly state that among the 
objectives pursued by their industrialization 
policy mechanisms is included the achieve-
ment of what is described as the 'harmonious 
and balanced' or 'equitable' development of 
all the member countries; in the case of the 
new UDEAC Treaty, mention is even made 
of sectoral industrial programmes, although 
the instrument is not precisely defined and 
has not been really brought into operation. 
This latter step has, however, been taken in 
the Andean Group, which in this connexion 
is the exception to the rule. 
The reasons why the preferential sys-
tems stipulated in some integration formulas 
have been ineffectual have often been 
analysed.20 In brief, most of them have been 
of a defensive character (like the East 
African Community's transfer tax), or have 
been confined to granting certain tariff 
preferences which, of course, have not been 
sufficient to offset the advantages of siting in 
the more dynamic countries. Whenever 
treaties have made express mention of 
industrial policies aiming at balanced devel-
opment, the common practice has been to 
deliver them over to an almost impossible 
case-by-case negotiation (as was done with 
the Régime for Central American Inte-
gration Industries or the allocation of indus-
tries in the East African Community or in 
UDEAC), or to deal with the subject in such 
general terms that the whole thing has 
stopped at declarations of no practical im-
portance. 
The system of the Andean Group, 
which, as said above, has shown itself ap-
2 0 See footnote 15, and also Germánico Salgado, 
"Economic integration of developing countries and 
the role of joint industrial planning", Journal of Devel-
opment Planning, N.° 8, United Nations publication, 
New York, 1975. 
propriate up to now for the purposes in 
question, consists in programming of com-
munal enterprise by industrial sectors, and 
its essence is the determination of sitings 
which will serve as an authentic factor in the 
promotion of investment. In this sense, 
despite the difficulties and conflicts that 
have had to be faced in the preparation and 
negotiation of the programmes, it would 
seem to be a valid instrument as an element 
of partial compensation for the differences in 
national capacities to promote the devel-
opment of integration industries. The full 
implementation of the programmes will 
have to be awaited before a more definite 
judgement on the efficacy of the mechanism 
can be formulated, but the partial successes 
achieved so far, and above all the expecta-
tions generated, warrant the assertion that it 
has managed largely to prevent the dissatis-
faction and the apprehensions on which 
integration efforts have hitherto run aground 
after their first two or three years of 
existence. This evaluation, which takes into 
account the conditions of heterogeneity 
proper to the Andean Group, could not be 
extended to any or every integration system. 
For example, such extreme situations of 
heterogeneity can be imagined as would 
make it impossible for programming to work 
at all. The subject will be dealt with in 
greater detail in a later section of the present 
article. 
4. Other differences in economic structure 
The reference made above to the differ-
ences in the scope and functions of State 
enterprises brought to the fore a kind of 
problem which derives from dissimilarities 
in economic and social structure between 
the countries seeking integration. These 
differences affect the motivation for inte-
gration, or the applicability and efficacy of its 
instruments. 
Examination of the integration group-
ings of the developing world reveals several 
outstanding illustrations of problems of this 
kind. For example, in the Central American 
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Common Market the difference between 
the economic and social structure of Costa 
Rica and that of the other member countries 
seems, in my opinion, to account for the 
difficulties which have been encountered 
in harmonizing their policies (exchange 
policy, for example). In ALALC's case, one 
cannot but see how far the possibilities of 
harmonizing policies are limited by the 
existence of marked differences in certain 
characteristics of the member countries' 
economies, such as rates of inflation, for 
example, which are so persistent in certain 
Latin American countries and reflect real-
ities of their economic and social structure. 
Again, differences of this kind, albeit less 
marked, appear to have contributed to some 
extent to the problems of the East African 
Community. 
Other examples could be cited of struc-
tural differences which in the gestation of 
these movements restrict integration objec-
tives and subsequently hamper the advance 
of the process. It is important to distinguish 
them from other differences in economic 
policy which are normal among countries 
seeking integration, and whose gradual 
reconciliation is the essence of integration 
policies. When there are several possible 
economic policy options for achieving ends 
that the States cannot forego, such as 
economic development or political stability, 
and of these options one or more offer better 
prospects for integration, a terrain has been 
reached in which efforts at reconciliation, 
harmonization and even unification of poli-
cies can bear fruit. 
Normally, a measure of freedom of 
choice exists in respect of the economic 
policies formulated to strengthen or counter-
act certain features of the economic struc-
ture; for example, to promote export diver-
sification it is possible to choose between 
uniformly low tariffs and subsidies, and one 
or the other, according to circumstances, 
may be more favourable for reconciling 
policies with a view to integration. This 
freedom of choice is lacking in the case of 
policies determined by basic features of the 
economic structure which it is not intended 
to alter, or which, if they are unfavourable, 
can be changed only by slow degrees. Thus, 
countries with more highly developed social 
and economic structures will be opposed to 
a reconciliation of policies which in one way 
or another may cause in their case regressive 
income redistribution; and, to cite another 
example, it would be very difficult for 
countries with chronic inflation to allow 
others to impose upon them a harmonization 
of exchange policy based on fixed rates of 
exchange.21 Numbers of similar examples 
could be adduced which arise out of situa-
tions so deep-rooted that over the short and 
medium term they seem to leave no alter-
native open. So long as these features remain 
unchanged, the integration movement 
—which may be a way of changing them 
gradually— will have to adapt its instru-
ments to them, or will find itself compelled 
to limit its objectives. Later on the structural 
differences that appear to be most closely 
linked to integration problems will be 
reviewed. 
Hitherto the aim pursued has been to 
classify the problems noted in the inte-
gration groupings of developing countries 
according to their nature, with a view to 
arriving subsequently at some conclusions 
of a fairly general character. To this latter 
purpose the following section will be devot-
ed, with due regard to the fact that the 
analysis is based on certain hypotheses as to 
collective motivations which obviously 
imply a simplification of the real situations. 
2 For a more systematic discussion of the subject, 
see Germánico Salgado, "Integración, conciliación de 
políticas y diferencias de estructura económica", in 
Instituto para la Integración de América Latina, Inte-
gración Económica, Year 2, N.° 3, Buenos Aires (Ar-
gentina), May 1977. 
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IV 
Motivations and patterns of viable integration 
In this section an attempt will be made to 
assemble the conclusions of the foregoing 
analysis in a tentative theoretical system 
whereby attention can be focused on some of 
the basic variables of the integration process 
among developing countries. Inevitably, 
political and sociological concepts will be 
involved in respect of which the author has 
no professional qualifications. His excuse for 
venturing into their domain is that in face 
of the problems of integration and its 
repeated failures a broad view of social 
action is more important than the rigour of 
exclusively economic analysis. The present 
paper will have fulfilled its purpose if it 
serves to point out elements that have been 
somewhat neglected in the analysis of 
integration and if it thereby makes for 
greater realism in the policies which, with 
integration objectives in view, the develop-
ing countries concert. 
Initially, a brief description will be 
given of those motivations which, to judge 
from experience, have done most to induce 
developing countries to decide on integrat-
ing their economies. 
Industrial development and techno-
logical progress. The objective pursued is 
not a mere quantitative change in industrial-
ization in general, but a different structure of 
industrial activity, which, in addition to its 
other economic effects, may stimulate 
technological progress and more profoundly 
influence economic activity as a whole. For 
the sake of brevity, in the text this motivation 
will be designated that of 'change in indus-
trial structure'. 
Expansion of trade and more efficient 
utilization of existing production capacity. 
This is the motivation on which the analysis 
of integration benefits is usually based. The 
expansion of the market by the liberalization 
of trade permits of specialization and the 
more efficient use of installed capacity. It also 
furthers industrialization objectives, in so 
far as trade induces the installation of addi-
tional capacity and enables the industrial 
structure to evolve towards a higher degree 
of specialization. 
Increase in capacity to negotiate with 
third parties. Improvement of inter-State 
political relationships. These last two 
motivations play a very important part in the 
gestation of integration movements, and 
neglect of the second in particular may result 
in the stagnation or disruption of programmes. 
Nevertheless, these two 'political' in-
centives carry much less weight than the 
first two, which we will call 'economic', 
when it comes to establishing the objectives 
and patterns of integration. The analysis in 
this section will pivot upon these economic 
motivations, although later we shall briefly 
revert to the influence of political motiva-
tions, or of their absence. 
A propos of these economic motivations 
a word of warning is due. They represent the 
immediate ends that economic integration 
may help to attain, but underlying them, 
obviously, is the aspiration towards econom-
ic and social progress, with a whole series 
of objectives such as the growth of the 
product, increased employment, the eradi-
cation of poverty and others. Strictly speak-
ing, the preference for industrialization 
or for the expansion of trade implies a 
relationship between these phenomena and 
the overall development of society, which 
would appear to be the ultimate motivation 
of integration. For the purpose of analysing 
the objective and instruments of integra-
tion, however, it is desirable to concentrate 
on the goals which the latter, as an economic 
policy, can directly attain, and they are in the 
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last analysis those which correspond to the 
two economic motivations mentioned 
above.22 
The distinction between these two 
economic motivations signifies undoubtedly 
some simplification, since they could be 
seen as gradations in a continuous spectrum. 
It was thought preferable, however, to mark 
the differences between the aspiration 
which implies the evolutionary growth of 
an industrial base, and that which involves a 
switch-over from one industrial structure to 
another thanks to the broadening of the 
market. This is not only more in keeping 
with political perceptions of the industriali-
zation phenomenon, but is also warranted by 
the possibility of discontinuities in the 
economic development process. 
Of the two economic motivations in 
question, it is the one related to the 
expansion of trade that has, in the writer's 
opinion, most strongly influenced the 
integration movements concerted among 
industrialized countries, although that of 
industrial change is present top, since even : 
in such economies there may be different 
degrees of industrialization and structures of 
greater or lesser efficiency, partly conse-
quen t upon the limitations of the national 
markets. At all events, it may safely be said 
that in the case of the industrial countries the 
expansion of trade is a stronger motivation 
than industrial change. In the terms we shall 
use throughout the rest of this paper, thé first 
of these could be described as having, in 
such circumstances, greater 'intensity' than 
the second, and as holding, for that very 
reason, a higher 'rank' among the motives for 
integration. 
2 2 For the sake of brevity, no attempt will be made 
he re to elucidate the relations between integration and 
the development of activities other than industry, such 
as agriculture. Although this development is at least 
partly implicit in the phenomena to which the two 
economic motivations relate, the fact that It is not 
explicitly mentioned suggests the View that irifegra-
tion, as an economic policy* can more efficaciously 
serve the purposes of industrial development than those 
of other sectors of activity. 
Observation of what has happened in 
the integration groupings of the developing 
world indicates, in contrast, that ordinarily 
the industrial change motivation predomi-
nates, which is not surprising in view of the 
deficiencies and gaps in their industrial 
structure. Although both economic motiva-
tions are present and influence integration 
decisions, it is the second that prevails, and 
primarily accounts for their adoption; that is, 
it is of greater 'intensity' and higher 'rank' 
than the first. Nevertheless, in developing 
countries whose industrial structures are 
quite well-developed and efficient, at least 
in respect of certain branches of specializa-
tion —often because their national markets 
are large—, it may well happen that the 
expansion of trade takes precedence over 
industrial change as a motivation; this seems 
logical, given their circumstances, where 
integration with other developing countries 
is concerned. 
Obviously, the intensity and ranking of 
the motivations will determine the objec-
tives which each country hopes to attain 
through the integration process. If in each of 
the countries participating in the integration 
movement the intensity and rank of the 
motivations coincide, a similar coincidence 
may be expected in the objectives by which 
the process is inspired, in what is demanded 
of it, and, consequently, in the main aspects 
of its instrumental patterns. 
But even if in the individual countries 
participating in an integration movement the 
motivation constituted by a change in indus-
trial structure is of greater intensity than that 
represented by the expansion of trade, and 
accordingly the former ranks higher than the 
latter —which would be almost the norm 
among developing countries—, there is no 
reason to expect that the intensity and 
consequent ranking of motivations will be 
similar in all the member countries. They 
will be different if conditions differ from one 
country to another; and furthermore, they 
are exposed to modification in function of 
the relative position that each of them holds 
within the integration programme. This 
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relative position may even alter the ranking 
of the motivations. This might happen, for 
example, in a country whose national market 
is much larger than that of another partici-
pant in the integration formula. The first of 
these countries may be strongly motivated 
by the change in industrial structure, and 
much more feebly by the expansion of trade; 
nevertheless, if it took the path of integration 
with the country whose market was smaller, 
the trade expansion motivation might 
prevail, because that would be the objective 
which the integration in question would 
enable it to attain. There would be no reason 
for this change in rank to occur in the other 
country. In those circumstances, it is logical 
that the two countries should differ with 
respect to what each demands from the 
process and to the instruments they are 
prepared to use, a discrepancy which, as has 
been shown, is the major source of conflicts 
in the integration movements of the devel-
oping world. 
Accordingly, it is worth while to look 
into the factors that influence the intensity 
and rank of the motivations of countries 
seeking integration. The analysis would 
become too complex unless hypotheses 
were established that take for granted cer-
tain variables conditioning social action 
from outside, or stemming from internal 
changes in the power structure with their 
corresponding ideological connotations. For 
example, a reduction of the degree of 
autonomy tolerated by the international 
power centres will almost certainly affect the 
political expression of the incentives to 
integration; this may also happen if changes 
in the dominant groups in a society involve a 
modification of the prevailing ideology, in a 
direction either more or less favourable to 
integration than the preceding situation. 
Thus, the tide of free-trade policy which has 
begun to sweep through Latin America in 
the past few years has undoubtedly helped 
to weaken the intensity of such motivations, 
and the above-mentioned problems of the 
Andean Group with Chile are a valid 
illustration of this phenomenon. Similar 
effects would be produced by the spread of 
the power of the transnational corporations, 
in so far as they use developing economies as 
subsidiary centres for exports to interna-
tional markets, which is already happening 
in the more advanced countries of the Third 
World. 
If, for the purposes of the analysis, these 
variables are taken to remain unchanged, 
and if, moreover, we confine ourselves to the 
most general determinants of these prefer-
ences for industrialization or for the expan-
sion of trade, shelving other circumstances 
of economic structure which are proper to 
each individual country, it might be asserted 
that the intensity and rank of the motivations 
of countries seeking integration are influ-
enced by the following factors: 
(i) the degree of industrial development 
that a country has attained, and the relation 
existing between its economic dimensions 
and the market size that would be necessary 
in order to achieve the desired change in the 
industrial structure; 
(ii) the economic dimensions of the 
integration area in relation to the size which 
would be necessary in order to bring about 
that desired change in the industrial struc-
ture; 
(iii) the country's relative position, as 
regards the degree of industrial develop-
ment attained, vis-à-vis other countries 
participating in the integration movement. 
The writer is aware of the limitations of 
the concepts 'degree of industrial develop-
ment' and 'economic dimensions'. What is 
meant by the latter is the capacity as a market 
of a national economy, or of the integration 
area, as the case may be. Implicit in this is an 
idea of scale projected into the macro-
economic field which would not, of course, 
be single or invariable, but would rather 
indicate a range of dimensions tending to 
shift, with the evolution of technology, 
towards steadily increasing magnitudes. For 
the time being, it is not the purpose of the 
present paper to examine the difficulties of 
measuring the said dimension. Simply to 
provide, as a basis, some indicator of the 
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dimensions of the national economies, the 
annex presents, as already mentioned, data 
on the total gross national product and the 
population of the countries participating in 
the various integration formulas of the 
developing world. 
Still more complex is the concept of the 
degree of industrial development. There is 
no need here to pronounce in favour of any 
one of the compound indexes which have 
been proposed for its measurement. The 
important point is that the concept com-
prises, in addition to the element of efficien-
cy, an assessment of the greater or lesser 
degree of interdependence of industrial 
activities. In this context, key importance 
would attach to the development of activities 
producing intermediate and capital goods. 
Furthermore, implicit in the concept of the 
degree of industrial development attained 
by a country is a judgement of its capacity to 
take advantage of the industrial opportuni-
ties opened up to it by integration, for the 
said concept also represents the aptitude 
that a society has acquired for promoting and 
developing the new integration industries — 
an aptitude which we formerly termed 
capacity or potentiality for industrial devel-
opment. With these points clarified, the 
time is now ripe to analyse the influence 
of the elements in question on the two 
economic motivations for integration. 
The first of them, consisting in the 
degree of industrial development attained 
by a country and the existing relationship 
between its economic dimensions and the 
market size considered necessary for indus-
trial change (which for brevity's sake we 
shall henceforward describe as 'required'),23 
exerts a direct an powerful influence on 
motivations. The higher the degree of 
industrial development a country has 
achieved and the closer its economic dimen-
sions to the 'required' market size, the less 
will be the intensity of the two motivations. 
^Even though it may be different in each case 
according to the degree of development attained and 
other factors. 
Nevertheless, these factors would affect the 
industrial change motivation more pro-
foundly than that of the expansion of trade, 
since there is always the possibility that 
specialization may bring trade gains. Con-
versely, the lower a country's degree of 
industrial development and the farther its 
economic dimensions from the 'required' 
market size, the greater will be the intensity 
of the two motivations, especially of that 
relating to industrial change. For the same 
reason, in the ranking of the motivations 
appreciable differences may be expected 
between the two, with some countries giving 
more relative importance to the expansion of 
trade and others to industrial change. 
The second element relates to the effect 
of the size of the integration area on motiva-
tions. A large integration area, with dimen-
sions equalling or exceeding the size 
'required' by the most industrially devel-
oped of the countries seeking integration, 
will be favourable to the intensity of both 
motivations in all participants, but particu-
larly to that of the industrial change incen-
tive. An integration area of lees than the size 
'required' by one or more of the participating 
countries would weaken the intensity of 
both motivations, at least in the more indus-
trially developed countries, and in particular 
would lessen that of industrial change in 
relation to that of' trade expansion. In 
contrast, a large integration area would at-
tenuate the difference in motivations attrib-
utable to the degree of industrial develop-
ment attained, while a small integration area 
would aggravate those differences in inten-
sity and rank. 
Clearly, the evaluation of an integration 
area as large or small depends first and 
foremost upon its relation to the size 
'required' by the most industrially advanced 
of the participating countries. In this sense, 
and with respect to its effect on motivations, 
the size of the integration area is a relative 
concept, so that it is possible to conceive of 
integration areas which can be described as 
small in function of a particular experience 
and which, nevertheless, are sufficient, that 
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is, equal or superior in size to the dimensions 
'required' by any of the participants. We said 
that this relativity exists, in the first place, 
because an integration area that is small in 
absolute terms —i.e., measured by the ideal 
margins of size demanded by technical 
progress— will tend to become insufficient 
more quickly if really good use is made of 
integration opportunities. But as long as this 
does not happen, as long as the size of the 
area remains adequate, there will be no 
reason for it to inhibit the industrial change 
motivation. 
The third element, which has to do with 
each country's relative position within the 
integration area, that is, vis-à-vis the other 
members of the movement, opens the sub-
ject that we believe to be of fundamental 
importance: that of the differences in indus-
trial development between the countries 
members of an integration area, i.e., the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of this charac-
teristic of their economic structure. 
Part of the consequences of this hetero-
geneity (or homogeneity) can be deduced 
from the analysis made, in the context of 
heterogeneity, of the effects produced on 
motivations by the degree of industrial 
development that each country has attained 
and the market size 'required' for industrial 
change. In this case, the effect of hetero-
geneity is determined by comparing the 
countries' individual situations, without ref-
erence to their interrelationships. 
But just as important as this first effect of 
heterogeneity are the repercussions of each 
country's relative position within the inte-
gration programme: that is, the changes that 
these same motivations undergo as a result of 
each country's individual situation, once its 
relation to the situations of the other coun-
tries is established. In this case it is no longer 
a country's own degree of industrial devel-
opment that is the determining factor but 
that of the rest, inasmuch as it may signify a 
difference in the capacity to benefit by 
integration, and relatively advantageous or 
disadvantageous positions which undoubt-
edly affect motivations. It is certainly 
reasonable to suppose that countries with a 
higher degree of industrialization are in a 
more favourable position than the less 
industrialized to turn to good account the 
oportunities afforded by integration, both for 
industrialization and for the expansion of 
trade. They are so not only by virtue of their 
productive base, but on account of their 
capacity to outstrip the less advanced coun-
tries in the development of the new inte-
gration industries. These are real situations 
of superiority or inferiority in relation to the 
preference for industrialization, that in the 
sphere of integration policy are frequently 
associated with collective feelings of rela-
tive 'superiority' or 'inferiority' which, of 
course, have powerful repercussions on the 
motivations. 
Because of these absolute or relative 
effects, the greater the heterogeneity, the 
more marked will be, in general, the dif-
ferences in the intensity and ranking of the 
motivations. It is possible to imagine situa-
tions, however, in- which the effect of the 
relative positions tends to counteract the 
differences in motivations stemming from 
the other factors. This may happen when 
awareness of their relative position has so 
acute an inhibitive effect on the industrial 
change motivation in the weaker countries 
that it brings them closer to the stronger in 
respect of the intensity and ranking of 
motivations. In that case, however, in view 
of the insufficient intensity of the moti-
vations, the conditions for integration would 
not exist, a circumstance that would indicate 
an extreme situation. 
Consequently, it may be said that the 
heterogeneity of countries as regards their 
degree of industrial development (and their 
capacity to change their industrial structure) 
is reflected in differences in the intensity 
and ranking of motivations, and that these, 
except in extreme cases, are accentuated 
when awareness of the relative position 
within the integration area comes into play. 
In contrast, homogeneity in respect of these 
characteristics would have the opposite 
effect, and that would imply greater coin-
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cidence in the choice of integration objec-
tives and of the instrumental patterns of the 
process. 
An analysis of the whole varied range of 
possible combinations, taking into account 
the different options consistent with the 
three concepts described, would be not only 
tiresome but somewhat meaningless. Suffice 
it, therefore, to assemble its conclusions in a 
simple presentation of the circumstances 
considered most propitious for economic 
integration from the standpoint of the co-
herence of the participants' motivations. 
These favourable conditions would occur in 
the following cases: 
(i) the lower the degree of industrial 
development attained by the participating 
countries and the farther their economic 
dimensions from the size 'required' for a 
change in the industrial structure; 
(ii) the larger the economic dimensions 
of the integration area and the higher the 
degree in which it approaches or exceeds the 
economic size 'required' by all the partici-
pants; 
(iii) the more homogeneous (or the less 
heterogeneous) the participants as regards 
the degree of industrial development at-
tained and their economic dimensions. 
It might be alleged that the first condi-
tion contradicts the second. This is not 
necessarily so. Even if the countries are of 
limited economic size, the integration area 
may be large enough if the grouping compri-
ses a considerable number of countries. This 
may involve problems of another kind (of 
management, for example), but not those of 
motivation. As already pointed out, the 
condition may even be fulfilled, at least 
temporarily, even if the integration area is 
small in absolute terms, provided that it is 
sufficient for the industrially most devel-
oped of the countries seeking integration. 
With these conclusions in mind, the 
next question to be asked is what would be 
the conditions least favourable to economic 
integration. Conversely, they would exist in 
the following circumstances: 
(i) the higher the degree of industrial 
development attained by the participating 
countries and the closer their economic 
dimensions to the size 'required' for a 
change in the industrial structure; 
(ii) the smaller the economic dimen-
sions of the integration area and the farther it 
is from the economic size 'required' by the 
participants; 
(iii) the more heterogeneous the partici-
pants as regards the degree of industrial de-
velopment attained and their economic 
dimensions. 
The real phenomena of economic inte-
gration lie between these extremes. The 
next step is to identify a few type cases 
among all the possible alternatives. 
In the optimum situation, which we will 
call case A, the participants would be at a low 
stage of industrial development and their 
economies would be of small size, so that the 
degree of intensity of both the economic 
motivations for integration would be high, 
but especially so in the case of that relating to 
industrial change. The integration area be-
ing large, this intensity would be still further 
accentuated, and the relative homogeneity 
in the industrial development of the coun-
tries concerned would facilitate coincidence 
of the objectives of the integration effort and 
therefore of its instrumental patterns. Mar-
ket integration could be in depth, that is, 
ambitious with regard to the unification of 
the economic space, and broad in respect of 
the activities comprised in the process. The 
relative homogeneity of the countries would 
create real and psychological conditions 
favourable to the operation of automatic 
trade liberalization mechanisms (unless the 
countries concerned were socialist) as a 
means of allocating resources in the new 
economic space. This would simplify the 
instruments of integration and its institution-
al organization, which could dispense with 
communal planning organs, necessary main-
ly to ward off conflicts deriving from the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of 
integration. 
Nevertheless, the ambitious integration 
objectives which the grouping would set up 
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in this case would call for harmonization or 
unification of policy on several fronts, 
implying complex action and communal 
technical and administrative institutions, as 
well as organs empowered to settle contro-
versies. 
Thus outlined, the conditions in case A 
—the optimum situation— recall the hypo-
theses on which the classic model of a 
customs union is based, and the conclusions 
as to the media and instruments of inte-
gration are therefore identical in the two 
cases. 
If in this ideal type case, characterized 
by the most favourable conditions, each of 
those conditions in turn is replaced by its 
opposite, i.e., the condition that is most 
unfavourable, several typical situations take 
shape, one or two of the most relevant of 
which will next be examined. 
Case B would result from replacing the 
first condition in the optimum case by its 
contrary, and, therefore, would represent an 
integration programme characterized by: (i) 
member countries with a relatively high 
degree of industrial development and eco-
nomic dimensions close to the 'required' 
size; (ii) a large integration area, bigger than 
the market size 'required' by any of the 
participants for industrial change; and (iii) 
relative homogeneity of the member coun-
tries in their degree of industrial devel-
opment and their economic size. The inten-
sity of the motivations would be less than in 
case A, and this reduction of intensity would 
be particularly marked in the motivation 
relating to a change in the industrial struc-
ture, since even without integration the 
countries concerned would be very near to 
attaining the market size they would need 
for such development. The inhibitive effect 
would also extend to the trade expansion 
motivation, but it would probably be less, 
since the expansion of the market would 
make it possible to take full advantage of 
installed capacity and gradually consolidate 
lines of specialization. 
Given the favourable conditions as 
regards the size of the integration area and 
the homogeneity of the member countries, 
integration is possible and viable in case B. 
The motivations for market integration in 
depth and breadth would be lacking, but 
what could be envisaged would be selective 
action to concentrate effort in specific activi-
ties in which requirements of scale were 
greater. In these it would be possible to 
arrive at partial integration programmes 
which, with this limitation, might well be 
carried out in depth. With regard to the 
expansion of trade, the homogeneity of the 
countries in particular would be favourable 
to broad-based integration, although since 
the intensity of this motivation would in any 
event be slight, what is most likely is that, in 
default of other cohesive forces —of a 
political nature, for example— this inte-
gration would tend on the whole to be 
superficial. To sum up, in this case B a broad 
though superficial form of integration could 
be expected, except in certain economic 
activities, industrial or otherwise, where in 
order to profit by advantages of scale the co-
operation effort might gain in depth. 
As regards integration policies and 
institutions, this and the preceding case 
have in common the possibility of using 
relatively simple trade liberalization mech-
anisms. The looser integration which is the 
objective in case B could be achieved with 
fewer policy harmonization requisites, than 
in case A, and the organization could be 
simpler, except perhaps in the institutional 
mechanisms that might ultimately be need-
ed for administration of the sectors chosen 
for integration in greater depth. 
None of the developing countries' inte-
gration groupings would appear to approxi-
mate to case B if all their members are taken 
into account. If, however, we were to 
consider only the three largest ALALC 
countries —Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—, 
which because of the characteristics of the 
ALALC formula can establish interrelation-
ships virtually specific to themselves, we 
should meet with a situation not unlike case 
B. Roughly speaking, we should see that 
market integration is broad in scope, but 
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superficial, since liberalization is reduced to 
a generally low tariff preference. The com-
plementarity agreements, which in practice 
link up only these three countries, consti-
tute selective integration efforts in some-
what greater depth in certain industrial 
activities, more or less in line with what was 
indicated in this connexion in case B. It is 
interesting to note that despite the theoreti-
cal potentialities of integration among the 
three countries in question, none of them has 
proposed going any farther, a fact which is 
symptomatic of the weakness of their moti-
vations. 
Case C would result from replacing the 
large integration area in case A by a small 
one, falling short of the size 'required' by the 
participants for a change in their industrial 
structure. The other two conditions would 
remain the same: the low degree of indus-
trial development and narrow economic 
dimensions of the member countries, togeth-
er with homogeneity among them in respect 
of these characteristics. 
Given the characteristics of the case as 
set forth, the size of the integration area 
would be smaller than that 'required' by 
each and all of the participants, since in this 
sense they would be homogeneous. Thus, 
the 'required' dimensions should be under-
stood in relation to the industrial change 
objectives proper to those countries, which 
would not necessarily propose as their target 
the development of an integrated industry 
producing intermediate and capital goods. 
Strictly speaking, to constitute case C it 
would be enough for the size of the area to be 
insufficient for attainment of the 'higher' 
stages that all the participants would be able 
and wishful to attain, even if these were less 
ambitious than the development of an 
advanced industrial sector. 
The foregoing requisites are not of 
course met just by any industrial progress 
whatsoever. If the countries submit to the 
demands of integration, they do so because it 
may enable them to achieve what they 
consider a substantial advance, as, for exam-
ple, the move from an industrialization 
process covering only a limited range of 
current consumer goods to an industrial 
structure which comprises the manufacture 
of durable consumer goods, some inter-
mediate products and simple capital goods, 
such as machine-tools. Implicit in the refer-
ence to 'higher stages', therefore, is the idea 
of discontinuity in the development process, 
even though it may be modest in its scope. 
The case being thus defined, if the 
integration area did not even reach the 
dimensions required for the desired 'stage' 
of industrialization, the high intensity and 
coherence of motivations that the character-
istics of the countries might lead one to 
expect would be partly offset by the small-
ness of the area, which would inhibit, above 
all, the industrial change motivation. The 
result would then be an integration that was 
superficial in its effects, even though liberal-
ization might be complete. The trade expan-
sion motivation would probably be less 
affected by the modest size of the integration 
area, and, consequently, there would be a 
tendency to attach more importance to the 
mechanisms that might facilitate the growth 
of trade than to those through which the 
creation of the new integration industry 
could be encouraged. Integration policies 
would perhaps be more complex than in case 
B and more similar to those of case A, given 
the full opening-up of markets which would 
be necessary if the limited effects of such an 
integration programme were to be turned to 
the best possible account. This would imply 
harmonization of policies and, therefore, a 
relatively well-developed institutional or-
ganization. In view of the homogeneity of 
the countries, however, liberalization might 
function effectively through automatic open-
ing mechanisms which would minimize the 
need for communal bodies. 
The fragility of an integration programme 
implemented in such conditions stems 
precisely from the contrast between the 
requirements in respect of the opening-up of 
markets, a process always liable to breed 
conflict, and the limited effects which can be 
expected from it as regards industrial devel-
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opment. It is not very likely that the move-
ment will be able to give rise to a stable 
integrated society when, in face of the risk of 
conflict, no real possibility of approximating 
to the desired industrial development exists 
as a counterpart. 
The situation would be different in an 
integration programme whose participants, 
as in the preceding case, were only in the 
early stages of industrial development, small 
in their economic size and homogeneous in 
these characteristics, but which had at their 
disposal an integration area of the dimen-
sions 'required' for the attainment of the new 
'stage' of industrialization, in the sense 
indicated above. This would be a situation 
assimilable to that of case A, more favourable 
to integration with all its functional conse-
quences. One reservation must be made, 
however. As a real advance into this stage 
was achieved, even if only in part, the size of 
the integration area might become a limiting 
factor and the conditions of the integration 
movement might approximate more close-
ly to those of case C. 
This collision with the frontiers of the 
integration area might be theoretically pos-
tulated for any integration movement as an 
event that sooner or later will come to pass. 
In practice, given the time required for such 
integration as will make it possible to pursue 
the ambitious objective of laying the founda-
tions of a modern industrial sector, with all 
its wealth of interdependent relationships 
and technological stimuli, the limiting effect 
would be valid solely for groupings whose 
integration area allowed them to reach only 
the relatively modest stages to which refer-
ence was made above. If such groupings 
were successful, they would have to enlarge 
the integration area by admitting new mem-
bers or through fusion with other integration 
programmes, in order to pave the way for 
new and stable forms of integrated societies. 
Several of the integration groupings in 
the developing world are operating in 
integration areas which can be classed as 
small by all criteria. While it is very risky to 
hazard opinions on this subject, for illustra-
tive purposes it might be said that two of 
them, the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union (UDEAC) and CARICOM 
are similar to case C as regards the size of the 
integration area, although strictly speaking 
they could not be fully likened to it because 
of the relatively marked heterogeneity of 
their members. This, of course, would not 
prevent them from feeling the inhibitive 
effect on motivations produced by a small 
integration area. Two other groupings, the 
Central American Common Market and the 
East African Community, are probably 
among those whose area is 'sufficient' as the 
setting for an integration effort with all its 
motivations, but they are exposed, as indus-
trial development opportunities are exploit-
ed, to the possibility of needing to enlarge 
the area in a fairly short space of time. Nor 
are they strictly assimilable to case C, be-
cause of their internal heterogeneity, but 
they do constitute an acceptable illustration 
of that particular situation as far as the size of 
the integration area is concerned. 
Case D is undoubtedly the most inter-
esting for the purposes of analysing the real 
circumstances of many processes of inte-
gration among developing countries. It is 
characterized by the introduction of the 
element of heterogeneity among the mem-
ber countries, while the other conditions, 
which are favourable, remain unchanged. 
That is, case D will cover the possibilities of 
integration among heterogeneous countries 
with a relatively low degree of industrial 
development and of relatively small size, 
and constituting in the aggregate a large 
integration area, equalling or exceeding the 
'required' dimensions. Except for the hete-
rogeneity factor, the conditions would be 
favourable for broad-based integration in 
depth. 
In this set-up we shall see how striking 
is the effect of heterogeneity in the degree of 
industrial development achieved. All the 
countries that in this respect are in an 
inferior position in relation to one or more 
members of the programme will be unwill-
ing to move towards broad-based integration 
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in depth with a view to attaining either of the 
two objectives —industrial development or 
trade expansion—, at least in their relations 
with the larger countries. Ambivalence 
would undoubtedly exist: each country 
would be prepared for integration of this 
kind with the less developed countries but 
not with the larger ones. Yet unless inte-
gration were articulated by means of a 
network of bilateral treatments, which 
would certainly be possible but very dif-
ficult, the lack of coherence in motivations 
could have the general effect of leading, in 
relation to both objectives, to superficial 
forms of integration, on the whole restricted 
in their scope. This effect might be still more 
marked with respect to the expansion of 
trade, but the industrial development objec-
tive would suffer too. 
To give an idea of the conflictive 
potentialities inherent in heterogeneity, it is 
useful to point out the effects of this 
divergence on instrumental options. While 
the larger and industrially more developed 
countries will prefer the distribution of 
activities to be left to the market mechanism, 
and will want the least possible institutional 
interference with that mechanism, the weak-
er countries will naturally take up the 
opposite position, advocating deliberate dis-
tribution of activities and maximum insti-
tutional interference in the market. There 
can be no way out of the conflict, in default of 
the solutions to which we shall shortly refer, 
other than recourse to a superficial or loose 
form of integration, either by the express 
intention of the treaties or by the tacit 
method of non-implementation, not to men-
tion the possibilities of disruption. 
In conclusion, even though all the other 
circumstances may be favourable, including 
political motivation and bargaining capacity, 
the mere existence of this heterogeneity 
among the countries will mean that the 
integration patterns adopted are superficial 
and loose. But in this instance, in contradis-
tinction to cases B and C, it is possible to 
cancel out or at least to attenuate the effects 
of heterogeneity by introducing elements to 
offset the relative weakness of the smaller 
countries — namely, policy instruments, to 
which we shall be referring presently. For 
the moment it is of interest to point out that if 
this compensation is satisfactorily accorded 
and is acceptable to all, integration may be 
thoroughgoing and extensive in its objec-
tives, especially as regards tha change in in-
dustrial structure, for which favourable cir-
cumstances would be ensured and greater 
intensity of motivations would exist. The 
biggest difficulty lies in devising an effec-
tive compensation mechanism and getting 
the parties to accept it. This acceptance is 
undoubtedly influenced by the intensity of 
the economic motivations of the partici-
pants, b u t t h e importance of political consid-
erations or motivations should not be over-
looked. 
In describing the integration move-
ments of the developing world mention has 
already been made of the policies whereby it 
has been sought to compensate the situation 
of the weaker countries. Generally speaking, 
the tendency has been to apply a series of 
preferential tariff or tax treatments, and to 
grant advantages in respect of services, 
income redistribution and flows of capital. 
All these methods have failed to fulfill their 
function as compensatory mechanisms, and 
the conflicts have been maintained or re-
newed. The only policy that could have been 
an efficacious means of attenuating the effect 
of heterogeneity on the central motivation 
for integration —industrial change— would 
be direct distribution of the new integration 
industries among the member countries, 
keeping their allocation apart from the 
operation of the market. Almost of the 
integration treaties have recognized this, but 
only in the Andean Group, with its industrial 
programming, has it been possible to imple-
ment such a policy systematically and 
effectively enough, given the unwillingness 
of the more powerful countries to accept 
limitations of this kind. 
Of course, the mere existence of a 
compensatory mechanism like that des-
cribed, which implies a deliberate allocation 
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of resources and, in the last analysis, the 
operation of a communal planning organ, 
introduces one more factor of complexity 
into integration policy and institutions, even 
if it is much simpler than the industrial pro-
gramming of the Andean Group. At all 
events, it is necessary not only to use the 
whole arsenal of instruments for the open-
ing-up of markets and the harmonization of 
policies which integration in depth requires, 
but also to establish planning systems, 
which may vary in breadth of scope and full-
ness of detail, but which have to meet inevi-
tably exigent technical and political requi-
sites. 
If the concepts are used with a certain 
amount of latitude, there are several inte-
gration movements in the developing world 
which might be considered similar to case D. 
One has already been cited —the Andean 
Group— and others that could be added are 
the Central American Common Market and 
the East African Community, as long as the 
area remains 'sufficient', as well as the 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). As already stated, out of all 
these only one seems to have lound a 
mechanism to counterbalance heterogeneity 
which up to now appears to be efficacious. 
One of the reasons why the East African 
Community is moribund lies in its failure to 
put this mechanism into practice. It is to be 
hoped that the other two will hit upon 
methods of compensation appropriate to 
their own circumstances. 
To finish with this subject and, in 
particular, with the analysis of case D, it 
seems useful to point out that it will not 
always be possible to find a compensatory 
mechanism which is functional and ef-
fective, and, therefore, satisfactory to the 
smaller countries. If the differences be-
tween the member countries of an inte-
gration programme are very great, not even a 
communal programming mechanism of 
broad scope will be able in all cases to 
ensure a satisfactory distribution of activi-
ties, because, inter alia, many of the op-
portunities that integration would afford for 
the smaller countries will have been already 
snapped up by the larger ones, thanks to 
their degree of development itself. A situa-
tion like this no longer strictly corresponds 
to case D, in which it is assumed that the 
countries are heterogeneous but relatively 
small. 
If there were great differences in the 
degree of development and in the size of the 
countries, that is, if one more condition than 
in case D were altered, we might speak of a 
case E, which would exclude by definition 
the possibility of establishing effective and 
satisfactory compensation mechanisms. The 
result would simply be that the require-
ments for viable integration were absent. If 
this position were reached for political 
reasons, the most that could be hoped for 
would be a superficial and restricted link-
age, more or less on the same lines as in case 
D, without the intervention of programming. 
It is interesting to note that if the inter-
country differences in respect of industrial 
development and market size reach ex-
tremes, the real and psychological effect may 
eventually cut off the weaker countries 
entirely from all possibility of availing 
themselves of integration to change their 
industrial structure. In such circumstances, 
not only is integration limited in its scope, 
but it becomes inacceptable to these latter 
countries and, therefore, completely non-
viable. This case E, in which conditions of 
extreme divergence occur, recalls the classi-
cal model of world market integration 
through free trade, and there is nothing 
surprising in its not being regarded as a valid 
option for developing countries. 
Other cases might be analysed, in 
which, as in case E, more than one of the 
favourable conditions are simultaneously 
reversed. The consequence is that market 
integration is made increasingly difficult. 
For the purposes of the present paper, 
however, the cases examined will suffice. 
To sum up, it may be affirmed that only 
in two of these cases, A and D, is an 
integration programme viable which would 
be at once profound and broad in relation to 
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its two economic objectives, in particular 
that of industrial development. In case D, if 
the process is to have these characteristics, a 
mechanism to offset the effects of hetero-
geneity would be required. Without it, this 
case too would be unfavourable to such 
integration. 
All other possible combinations, inas-
much as they eliminate more than one of the 
favourable conditions, culminate, of course, 
in situations even less propitious for inte-
gration, although that does not mean that 
they preclude attemps at co-operation and 
even, in some circumstances, at integration,, 
if this is confined to fragmentary under-
takings of a superficial character. Unques-
tionably, however, authentic economic inte-
gration is not viable for any and every 
grouping of countries, and its characteristics 
and patterns cannot be identical in all 
circumstances. 
A useful point to note is that, as in case 
D, the unfavourable situations are not 
always irremediable, and if the motivations 
for integration persist, it is possible to 
suppose that the solutions found may serve 
as intermediate stages in a gradual approach 
towards more profound and broader forms of 
integration. For example, if the limiting 
factor is the size of the integration area 
—which is of particular importance for the 
industrial development objective—, this 
limitation can always be overcome by incor-
porating new members or through fusion 
with other integration movements.24 If the 
obstacle is heterogeneity, and it has not been 
possible to mitigate the effects by means of 
compensatory treatment, a more homoge-
neous ambit may feasibly be chosen in order 
to move towards broader integration in 
greater depth, as has happened in the case of 
the Andean Group within ALALC. Inte-
gration in this more homogeneous, albeit 
more restricted, sphere of action can be 
" A n increase in the number of members cannot 
but carry certain implications for the functionality of 
the process. Basically, it makes negotiations a more 
viewed in this instance as an intermediate 
stage on the way to fulfilment of the original 
intention, which will probably become 
possible in the future because heterogeneity 
has been reduced by virtue of this inter-
mediate integration. In short, if the neces-
sary motivations exist, the obstacles created 
by the factual circumstances in which inte-
gration has to work are milestones marking 
the successive stages on a road along which 
it is feasible to journey gradually towards 
closer and more satisfactory relationships. 
The only factors that cannot be modified 
by such means are the features of a country's 
economic structure which influence the 
intensity of its motivations. In the Case of 
countries with a relatively high degree of 
industrial development and dimensions 
close to those 'required', conditions are not 
favourable for comprehensive integration in 
depth. Only the weight carried by moti-
vations of a different kind, political in the 
broadest sense of the word, such as those 
emanating from the desire to increase bar-
gaining capacity or meet geopolitical needs, 
could induce in such countries an attitude 
open to ambitious integration agreements, 
and even then it is doubtful whether results 
will match intentions. There is no good 
reason to suppose, however, that this special 
situation of the bigger countries may not 
alter in the course of time. The probable 
enlargement of the size which we have 
called 'required', in consequence of tech-
nological progress in a world which de-
mands steadily increasing scales of activity, 
may in the future bring about changes in the 
intensity of motivations even in the larger 
countries: a fact which must be taken into 
account in contemplating this succession of 
possible stages in an integration effort which 
aims at climbing progressively higher within 
a continuing process. 
arduous task and may considerably complicate admin-
istration. However, no general rule can be laid down 
in this respect. 
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V 
Other differences in economic structure and 
their implications for integration 
In the preceding section consideration was 
given to only one of the differences of 
structure which are significant for economic 
integration: the degree of industrial devel-
opment attained. It is possibly the most 
important because it lies at the very root of 
the decision to seek integration, but it is not 
the only one, as we had occasion to note in 
describing the problems of the developing 
countries ' integration groupings. A number 
of other features of the evolution of a national 
economy may give rise to other differences 
in structure which also influence inte-
gration, and which are enumerated below in 
a list which makes no claim to be ex-
haustive.25 
(a) Differences in the structure of for-
eign trade originating in: 
(i) the structure of traditional exports 
and the nature of their markets; 
(ii) the degree of diversification of ex-
ports, especially in respect of indus-
trial products; 
(iii) the degree of dependence upon 
imports for supplies of foodstuffs 
and intermediate products; 
(b) Differences in direct State partici-
pation in economic production and distri-
but ion; 
(c) Differences in social structure and 
social policies, especially in relation to the 
system of ownership of the factors of pro-
duction, management of enterprises and 
income distribution; 
(d) Differences in rates of inflation 
2 5 The list does not include differences in treatment 
of foreign investment—¡m extremely important matter 
in any integration movement— because, as a general 
rule , in the sector for which the process is of most 
interest, i.e., manufacturing industry, such treatment is 
not determined by structural features, and there is a 
possibility of choosing between options either more 
or less favourable to integration. 
(when the processes concerned are deep-
rooted and the disparities are considerable). 
Even though the heterogeneity deriving 
from these characteristics does not affect the 
decision in favour of integration in the same 
way as that discussed in the preceding 
section, it does influence the possibilities of 
harmonizing or reconciling policies which, 
from the instrumental standpoint, serve to 
determine the new economic space. In this 
connexion, its importance, in the long run, 
equals or exceeds that of the opèning-up of 
the space in question through the liberal-
ization of trade, which, in any event, also 
constitutes a type of harmonization of pol-
icies. 
As was previously noted, the possibili-
ties of reconciliation are limited, at least 
temporarily, by these differences in struc-
ture which cannot be disregarded without 
casting doubt on the whole feasibility of the 
process. (Several relevant examples were 
cited earlier which need not be repeated 
here.) When this is the case, integration must 
seek new instruments, i.e., to use the 
terminology of the preceding section, com-
pensation mechanisms fitted to overcome 
the effects of this form of heterogeneity. A 
good example of such situations is that 
resulting from the activities of State produc-
tion or marketing agencies, which often 
bypass, for what may be perfectly legitimate 
reasons, cost and price considerations, and, 
to that extent, invalidate the operation of the 
usual trade liberalization mechanisms. The 
way to harmonization would not consist, in 
normal circumstances, in abolishing State 
trading agencies or relegating them to a 
marginal position, because this would mean 
subordinating the decision to follow a 
political model to integration requirements, 
a demand that cannot ordinarily be made. 
The only possibility of resolving such a 
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problem lies in attempting to harmonize 
State purchasing policies by means of a 
specific instrument, which would be a new 
item in the arsenal of integration policies. 
T h e East African Community formulated an 
agreement on this issue which could not 
afterwards be ratified. In default of this or 
some other mode of reconciliation of the 
relevant policies, in such a situation there is 
nothing to be done but tacitly to accept the 
fact that at least part of the trade concerned 
escapes the action of the liberalization 
mechanism. 
Looked at in this light, economic inte-
gration among developing countries be-
comes a matter that calls for a new and 
imaginative outlook. In the first place, in 
specific groupings economic integration 
may not be viable, and the analysis should 
provide some basis for a realistic appraisal of 
the possibilities. Furthermore, there is room 
for many different patterns of integration, as 
regards both objectives and instruments, and 
the structural conditions of the grouping and 
of its member countries should serve as a 
guide for choosing the most appropriate of 
these. Admittedly, the decision to seek 
integration is primarily a political one, and 
what is known as the political will may 
propose much more than seems reasonably 
viable. But the experience of the developing 
world suggests that never so far has the 
political will managed to override the eco-
nomic realities of the groupings, when they 
have not been taken into account from the 
outset in the integration formula. 
VI 
Intentions and realities: some conclusions respecting 
the errors in the conceptual basis of ALALC 
T h e conclusions to which the analysis pre-
sented in the last three sections leads cannot 
be rigidly or indiscriminately applied to real 
integration phenomena in order to establish 
the patterns suited to them and issue a final 
pronouncement on their viability. They are 
judgements based on simplifications of the 
complex fact of integration, and their useful-
ness depends upon the discretion with 
which they are used as a method of analysis 
of specific situations; as a method, this has 
the virtue of highlighting the probable origin 
of some of the more serious problems to 
which the process may be exposed. The 
importance which may attach to such prob-
lems in each individual case, the complexi-
ty with which they are invested by the action 
of other variables not taken into account in 
the analysis, and the influence which may be 
exerted upon them by specific economic or 
political circumstances, are facts which can 
only be evaluated through observation of the 
characteristics of each integration pro-
gramme. 
Despite all these limitations, the meth-
od of analysis suggested serves to under-
line certain aspects usually neglected in 
integration studies. In the integration theory 
that fais within the framework of the classi-
cal theory of international trade, the empha-
sis has hitherto been placed on the analysis 
of trade benefits. The key questions in this 
connexion have centred upon the advan-
tages or disadvantages of a spatially limited 
integration, whether in a context of free trade 
or of national protectionist policies. Formu-
lated in static or comparatively static terms, 
they are divorced from attemps to analyse 
economic integration in the framework of a 
theory of economic development. Even in 
this case, integration has been viewed 
exclusively as a policy instrument which 
must contribute to the attainment of certain 
objectives —such as industrialization, in-
creased efficiency in activities, power to 
negotiate with third parties—, and insuf-
ficient consideration has been given to the 
structure and characteristics of integration 
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groupings, in so far as these phenomena 
affect their capacity to achieve such ends and 
to maintain a distribution of costs and 
benefits which will make for the stability of 
the integrated society. 
It is of interest to note that some of these 
interpretations of the role of integration in 
the development of the poorer countries are 
in line with a conception of the international 
economy which, in contrast to classical 
theory, recognizes the determining func-
tion of differences in economic and political 
power, cases in point being the concept of 
centre-periphery relations formulated by 
CEPAL, or the theses of l'échange inégal. 
Nevertheless, for analytical purposes the 
subject of integration among developing 
countries has generally been tackled with-
out reference to the possible implications of 
the existence of various forms of heteroge-
neity among the participants, a circumstance 
which is in practice, as has been shown, the 
source of some of the major integration 
problems. These disparities have been ex-
amined only as a phenomenon which calls 
for specific instruments —preferential treat-
ments—, without full exploration of all their 
repercussions on the viability, objectives 
and patterns of integration. 
It is the aim of the present paper to 
awaken interest in these questions and to do 
something towards beginning to fill these 
gaps in the conceptions of integration. It 
makes no claim to supersede the two 
analytical approaches mentioned above. 
Within their own hypotheses, they are valid 
formulations of partial aspects of the inte-
gration phenomenon. In these pages an 
attempt has been made to look at another of 
its facets, with the intention of finding a body 
of criteria in the light of which some of the 
questions of most importance for the cons-
truction of economic integration can be more 
realistically studied. 
ALALC may afford an interesting illus-
tration of the ideas expounded. In sections I 
and II of the present paper the conceptions 
that prevailed in the constitution of ALALC 
were described, together with their evolu-
tion from the original CEPAL theses. The 
time has now come to ask ourselves how far 
the objectives set up corresponded to what 
might reasonably be expected of this inte-
gration movement, and how far the pattern of 
the formula was appropriate to the charac-
teristics of the grouping. 
This is not the place to describe in 
details the ups and downs of ALALC's 
existence. In earlier pages brief reference 
was made to the problems that it has had to 
face. To avoid dwelling too long on the 
subject, we will assume that the basic 
features of its evolution are already familiar. 
Suffice it to point out here that after a short 
period of progress along the lines originally 
projected, it soon sank into almost total 
stagnation, which is now threatening to 
become actual regression. The establish-
ment of the free-trade area has proved 
impracticable, and since the mid-1960s 
the negotiations have done nothing more 
than marginally enlarge the list of conces-
sions. In practice, ALALC has never got 
beyond a preferential area, and that not 
even at a level which can be described as 
high. These preferences are still main-
tained, and trade has expanded in absolute 
figures, but since 1970 it has been obvious 
that the share of the regional market in total 
Latin American exports is declining, even in 
the case of manufactures, where its impor-
tance is still considerable, but is decreas-
ing in relative terms.26 
Undeniably, the creation of ALALC was 
a decisive step in encouraging exports of 
manufactures from Latin America. In this 
sense, its economic potential did produce 
effects, despite the atrophy suffered by the 
liberalization programme. The expansion, 
nevertheless, was concentrated in a few 
countries, with a sequel of stresses and 
conflicts which has reduced it to the present 
stagnation. In 1974, in face of the impos-
2()CEFAL, "The economic and social development 
and external relations of Latin America" (E/CEPAL/ 
1024/Rev, 1), 14 June 1977, p. 263. 
124 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 7 / April 1979 
sibility of attaining the objectives of the 
original ALALC agreement, it was decided 
to begin negotiations with a view to re-
structuring the Treaty, but the divergence 
of positions was so marked, that it was im-
possible to reach a consensus. ALALC has 
cont inued to function in a languid fashion, 
still applying the system of concessions 
which had been arrived at when it came to 
a halt, but its deterioration will obviously 
be aggravated unless it manages to float 
itself fairly quickly off the reef. 
How far do the characteristics and the 
internal structure of ALALC account for 
these vicissitudes? One of its features fa-
vourable to broad-based integration in 
depth as previously defined is the size of the 
integration area, which is much bigger than 
that of the other groupings of this kind in 
the developing world.27 On the other hand, 
in the light of the criteria laid down before, 
the marked heterogeneity of its member 
countries is prejudicial to ALALC. They 
were and are strongly differentiated, both 
in the degree of industrial development 
attained and in their economic size, as well 
as in other structural features. The data on 
the population and national product of the 
member countries listed in the annex illus-
trate the wide disparities between them 
— disparities which were bound to be re-
flected in a defensive attitude on the part of 
the medium-sized and small countries 
vis-à-vis the three larger ones. As already 
stated, the latter were the chief benefi-
ciaries of the expansion of intra-regional 
exports, and almost the only countries 
capable of taking advantage of the comple-
mentarity agreements, which constituted 
the system set up for negotiating integration 
industry. 
2 ' I f the total gross national product is used as an 
indicator, we shall see that ALALC's was 260,000 
million dollars, while that of the grouping next in 
size, tlie Arab Economic Unity Council, amounted to 
78,000 million, according to figures for 1976 taken 
from World Bank Atlas: Population, Per Capita Prod-
uct and Growth Rates. 
In 1969 a group of medium-sized and 
small ALALC countries established the 
Andean Group, as a subregional grouping. 
The basic motivation was to promote inte-
gration in greater depth without the domi-
nant influence of the three larger countries: 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. The Carta-
gena Agreement, which brought the Andean 
Group into being, was declared compatible 
with ALALC, but undoubtedly, for the time 
being at least and while the Group was 
being consolidated, its existence helped to 
make the progress of the negotiations yet 
more difficult. 
The distribution of costs and benefits 
is not the only sphere in which the hetero-
geneity of the member countries has af-
fected ALALC. The very timidity of the 
objectives of the Treaty, which was carried 
so far as almost entirely to omit from it any 
provision on harmonization of policies, 
reflects the difficulty of uniting countries 
with such different characteristics in an 
integration movement. Not even the little 
that was included in respect of policies—the 
special provisions concerning agriculture, 
which were primarily a régime to protect 
domestic production— could be fully im-
plemented, for lack of agreement on one of 
its basic mechanisms. It is easy to imagine 
the inhibitive effect that must certainly have 
been produced by differences such as those 
existing between rates of inflation, structure 
of foreign trade, etc. The joint result was 
that in the end even the apparently unam-
bitious goals of the original Treaty could 
not be reached. ALALC is, therefore, a good 
example of an integration system whose 
fundamental problem —although not the 
only one— is the combination of pressures 
deriving from the heterogeneity of the 
member countries in size and structure. 
In accordance with the scheme pre-
sented, and confining ourselves for the time 
being to the heterogeneity attributable to 
differences in degrees of industrial devel-
opment and in economic size, marked 
contrasts were to be expected in the ALALC 
countries' motivations for integration. Given 
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their relative position within the grouping 
the larger and industrially more advanced 
countries were logically bound to be moti-
vated much more by the expansion of trade 
than by a change in industrial structure, 
whereas, conversely, the smaller and indus-
trially less developed members were neces-
sarily prompted more strongly by the indus-
trial change motivation and much less by 
that of trade expansion. This difference 
made itself apparent during the negotiations 
when the countries referred to what they 
were seeking through integration, and very 
strikingly in the propositions of the larger 
countries, particularly Brazil and Argentina. 
Strictly speaking, this lack of coherence 
in the intensity and ranking of motivations 
ought to have been manifested in the selec-
tion of integration patterns and instrumental 
options. The larger countries followed their 
own logical line: hence their persistent 
advocacy of a competitive market, based on 
a full liberalization of trade which would 
allow the price mechanism free play, to-
gether with all the implications of those 
principles as regards the other characteris-
tics of the formula. But matters were dif-
ferent with the medium-sized and small 
countries, which during the negotiations, as 
has been shown, accepted with apparent 
willingness not only the principle of free 
competition, but also the omission of any 
means of resorting to allocation of integra-
tion industries. They contented themselves 
with luke-warm insistence on preferential 
treatment, in any event very limited. This 
attitude changed some years later with 
experience of the process; but by that time 
it was impossible to go back on the prin-
ciples accepted, and no real success was 
achieved in strengthening the preferential 
treatment. In fact, these topics were the core 
of the deliberations which were recendy 
conducted in compliance with the Caracas 
Protocol, and in which, as has been pointed 
out, no consensus could be reached. 
In addition to this basic problem deriv-
ing from heterogeneity, difficulties in har-
monizing policies arose out of other dif-
ferences in economic structure, of which an 
example has already been given. It should 
be noted, however, that the early interrup-
tion of the ALALC liberalization programme 
detracted from the urgency of the need to 
harmonize policies and kept below the 
surface the most serious problems of this 
kind, i.e., those relating to harmonization 
of exchange policies. 
To sum up, ALALC was and is an 
integration grouping which, in simplified 
terms, displayed only one of the conditions 
we have called favourable to integration: 
the size of the new economic space. The 
marked differences between its member 
countries meant that their demands upon the 
process were different, and that same 
heterogeneity was bound to lead them 
sooner or later to prefer not only different but 
actually antagonistic instrumental pat-
terns, as did indeed happen. 
Clearly, a group with these characteris-
tics, which had established as its ultimate 
objective a free-trade area, i.e., full liber-
alization for 'substantially all' trade,28 need-
ed, if it was to advance without increasingly 
serious conflicts, a singularly efficacious 
system of differential or preferential treat-
ment, or, in other words, what we have 
called an effective mechanism to compen-
sate the heterogeneity among the member 
countries. 
Experience shows that the mechanism 
chosen by ALALC was far from possessing 
such efficacy. It has been feeble in its effects 
in relation to the relatively less developed 
countries, and non-existent for the countries 
of medium size. Mention has already been 
made of the concentration of trade flows; the 
medium-sized and small countries have not 
been excluded from participating in them, 
but they have done so in conditions which 
both quantitatively and qualitatively —i.e., 
as regards categories of goods— are clearly 
inferior to those enjoyed by the three larger 
2iiAt least 80% of trade, according to the GATT 
interpretation at the time when ALALC was set up. 
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countries. This situation partly reflects the 
minimal degree in which they have benefit-
ed b y the integration industries whose 
creation was the primary reason for their 
accession to ALALC. 
There is no need to expatiate on the 
scant effect of the preferential system, which 
has been one of the touchstones of the 
analyses of the Association. The medium-
sized countries —with insufficient mar-
kets— have not really received any kind of 
special treatment. The relatively less devel-
oped countries found themselves provided 
with a mechanism which could have been 
useful if they had possessed much greater 
bargaining capacity than they were really in 
a position to exercise; it was this that 
constituted, in point of fact, the logical flaw, 
the petitio principii, which invalidated the 
mechanism from its very foundations. Out of 
the long list of non-extensive special conces-
sions, very few have been really put to use, 
and, worse still, those of any significance 
have been even fewer. In many cases, the 
concessions relate to products of HtÜe 
economic importance with a low level of 
value added. In others, a concession which 
might have been meaningful on account of 
the product concerned is confined to charac-
teristics or qualities of that product which 
virtually annul it. Lasdy, concessions are 
accorded to complex industrial products 
manufactured on a fair scale, but in some 
instances these are goods which in practice 
cannot be produced, and in others they are 
produced as isolated items, albeit the tech-
nical and economic characteristics of the 
activities in question call for the manufac-
ture of ranges of products. 
In short, the essential instrument of the 
preferential system —the only one which 
really existed, and which, as has now been 
shown, is constituted by the special list of 
non-extensive concessions— has been un-
able to fulfil its function efficientíy. The 
other advantages, whose application in each 
specific case was left to the discretion of the 
parties, were never turned to account in 
practice. 
Despite subsequent attempts at recti-
fication, of which resolutions 74 and 101 are 
the outcome, the system has undergone no 
significant change, nor has it been possible 
to articulate the joint supporting action 
envisaged in resolution 101. In addition, 
since nothing was done to establish a more or 
less automatic mechanism to ensure imple-
mentation of the principle of reciprocity 
—the CEPAL proposition—, ALALC has 
lacked the ultimate stabilizing instrument 
which might have prevented the disequilib-
rium in the integration process from run-
ning to extremes. 
This ineflicacy of the compensation 
mechanism is almost exclusively due to the 
principles and conceptions by which its 
creation was governed. Where integration 
instruments are concerned, it is often the 
way they are put into practice that vitiate 
their function. That is not the case with the 
preferential treatment under discussion, 
whose weakness lies in the original ideas. 
What is more, the inefficiency of the com-
pensation mechanism was latent from the 
very moment when the 'competitiveness' of 
the market was almost unconditionally ac-
cepted as the guiding principle for the 
whole functioning of the integration pro-
gramme. The interpretation of this 'compet-
itiveness' conduced, as has been shown, to 
denial of the possibility of restricting com-
petition in certain 'allocated' activities. And, 
furthermore, it led to postulations which did 
not necessarily derive from the guiding 
principle, such as those of avoiding auto-
matic mechanisms as far as possible, reject-
ing rules whereby the parties' exercise of 
bargaining power could be in any way 
delimited to serve the joint interest, and 
reducing the communal organs' capacity for 
control and initiative. This meant that pref-
erential treatment, like the whole operation 
of the integration movement, was left sub-
ject to a continuous process of negotiation, in 
which, of course, the weaker parties were 
permanently at a disadvantage. 
In CEPAL's theses respecting differen-
tial treatment a distinction was drawn 
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be tween categories of goods and of coun-
tries. If that distinction had been accepted, 
there would have been at least a possibility 
of establishing from the outset some limita-
tion of the parties' power of negotiation 
with respect to the way in which the market-
opening mechanisms should be applied. Much 
the same thing would have been achieved 
if t he idea —also one of CEPAL's— 
of including some automatic safeguard of 
reciprocity had been taken up. The discus-
sion of the topic, conceptually dominated by 
the larger countries, left the preferential 
system stripped of all such elements, as alien 
and dysfunctional interpolations in a frame-
work governed exclusively by the bargain-
ing capacity of each of the parties. 
This does not mean that if the said 
C E P A L proposals had found a place in the 
final formula, the differential treatment 
would have been efficacious. The truth is, as 
experience has shown, that even with those 
additions, a mechanism based on the special 
concessions plus a few defensive prefer-
ences could in any event have done little to 
mitigate the consequences of the marked 
heterogeneity in the structure of ALALC. 
But at least there would have been some 
basis for reacting in face of the disequilibria, 
seeking to improve the system through the 
classification of goods and countries, and 
making further progress with the liberali-
zation programme. Given the shape in which 
the preferential treatment was finally incor-
porated in the formula, the outcome was 
bound to be early frustration and the ensuing 
stagnation. 
To sum up, it may be asserted that in this 
sense the evolution of ideas during the 
ALALC negotiations led to a contradictory 
result: on the one hand the objective aimed 
at became more ambitious, since the prefer-
ential area was superseded by the free-trade 
area, while at the same time the compensa-
tion mechanism was weakened. Obviously, 
the two things were mutually exclusive. 
I t would not be fair, however, to blame 
any of the protagonists of this frustrated 
creation of a Latin American common market 
for the mistakes committed when the com-
pensation mechanism was devised. Knowl-
edge of the subject of integration —the 
'state of the arts' which prevailed when 
ALALC was negotiated— was really rudi-
mentary,especiallywith respect to integra-
tion among developing countries, of which 
there was simply no experience. CEPAL's 
ideas, particularly the concept of special 
concessions, were already introducing 
innovations in this field, as has been pointed 
out, and this is still more striking in the case 
of the Central American Common Market, 
where CEPAL propounded theses which 
were to be the seed of what was afterwards 
called industrial programming. Neverthe-
less, the differential treatment was neither 
appropriate nor sufficient in the Central 
American Common Market, and still less 
so in ALALC and it is impossible to impute 
the fact solely or even chiefly to a distortion 
of ideas during the negotiations. It was the 
conceptions currently prevailing that carried 
the brunt of the responsibility, and there 
is no better proof of this than the very 
attitude of the weaker countries in accept-
ing, almost willingly, the whole set of 
conditioning factors which in practice made 
it impossible for the compensation mecha-
nism to function effectively. When they 
agreed to share with the larger coutries 
this interpretation à l'outrance of the prin-
ciple of 'free competition' in the market, the 
result was the disappearance of negotiation 
conditions which, probably at least, could 
have led to the construction of a formula for 
more valid compensation mechanisms.20 
The attitude of the larger countries had, 
of course, a decisive influence on the 
structuring of the market in conformity with 
the principles described; a contributory part 
was also played by GATT and the United 
States Government. These positions were 
naturally determined by the parties' own 
2 i ,The author can make this assertion without 
fear of injustice, since he participated, as representative 
of his country, in some of the rounds of the negotiation 
in question. 
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interests; but doubtless, neither were they 
unaffected by serious mistakes, also due to 
inexperience, in the evaluation of the pos-
sible gravity of the problems involved. 
Probably, inter alia, the degree of concentra-
tion of benefits which the formula would 
entail was underestimated, or, even more, 
the extent to which the reaction of those that 
were dissatisfied, among them the weaker 
countries, might hamstring the whole 
process. In combination with their own 
interests, 'this lack of knowledge and expe-
rience may also account for the political 
caginess of the larger countries vis-à-vis the 
demands of the rest —not very pressing 
either— to the effect that stronger equi-
libratory elements should be introduced into 
the system. 
For all these reasons, it might be said 
that when ALALC was set up with the 
characteristics that it was given, neither 
the knowledge nor the political will existed 
that were needed to devise and put into 
effect a mechanism to compensate the 
heterogeneity of the parties which was 
adequate for that specific integration for-
mula. Such a mechanism, given the existing 
differences, would have had to incorporate a 
series of powerful instruments, largely 
handled by communal organs. In the records 
of the negotiations there is no sign that they 
were ever even thought of, and undoubted-
ly, if they had been mentioned, they would 
not have been accepted as a whole by any of 
the participants. 
Today, in view of this fact, hindsight 
allows the suggestion to be hazarded that 
there were two elements in the evolution of 
ideas which really sealed the fate of the 
Association. These were: 
(i) T h e rejection of the exceptions to 
the most-favoured-nation clause 
which might have allowed the ex-
istence of subregional integration 
groupings; and 
(ii) the alteration of the objective of the 
formula from a preferential area to 
a free-trade area. 
T h e first of these formed part of 
CEPAL/s original conceptions; save for Cen-
tral American integration, CEPAL consid-
ered any kind of subregional 'exclusivism' 
within the global formula inadvisable and 
dangerous. This thesis was generally accept-
ed throughout the negotiations and, in the 
end, was incorporated in the Montevideo 
Treaty. Consequently —given the difficul-
ties of creating a compensation mechanism— 
the formula was deprived of the only effec-
tive means i tmighthave had of lessening the 
problems caused by heterogeneity. Owing 
to the pressure exerted by the countries 
forming the present Andean Group, flexi-
bility in this direction had to be accepted 
later on, unfortunately, however, only when 
it was too late, ALALC having already 
become a prey to stagnation. If it had been 
allowed from the outset, the programme 
would have had to be different in its 
instruments, deadlines and other aspects. 
The second element imposes greater 
demands on the formula, with the choice 
of a free-trade area as an objective; this is 
the loosest pattern in the traditional typology 
of integration, but in any event it implies a 
full opening-up of markets. Its very flexibili-
ty with regard to the absence of a common 
external tariff and other provisions for the 
harmonization of policies, although in some 
respects it allayed the misgivings of the 
weaker countries, left, on the other hand, an 
even broader field to the mercy of the 
bargaining capacity of the parties. All it 
did, at bottom, was to deepen the uncertainty 
and mistrust of those with the least bar-
gaining power. Accordingly, it would seem 
that the decisive juncture in the evolution 
of ideas occurred when the idea matured 
of abandoning the preferential area objec-
tive and choosing a free-trade area as the 
appropriate pattern, because of its greater 
formal richness and its compatibility with 
the exceptions allowed by GATT. According 
to the documents, as was remarked earlier, 
this happened at the time of the Consulta-
tions on Trade Policy with the participation 
of experts from the countries of the southern 
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zone of South America. Up to then CEPAL's 
preferential area thesis had prevailed; and 
while it is not certain that a compensation 
mechanism adequate for such a preferential 
area could have been constructed, succeed-
ing events leave no room for doubt that to 
do so was not feasible for the free-trade 
area. This circumstance, therefore, can well 
be described as decisive, unfortunately for 
the worse. 
Incidentally, the aforesaid change of 
objective, in conjuction with the aim of 
excluding subregional groupings, was also 
responsible for the shelving of the proposi-
tion that the market should be extended to 
include the whole of Latin America. The 
more stringent demands of the formula 
inevitably restricted the geographical scope 
of the grouping. It would have been very 
difficult for all the Latin American countries 
to have taken part in it from the outset; but 
probably most of them would have done so if 
it had been a matter of a preferential area, 
which would have allowed subregional 
linkages. An ALALC with those character-
istics would undoubtedly have attained 
much greater political significance than the 
grouping that finally came into being. The 
consequent increase in heterogeneity, from 
a functional standpoint, would have had 
only marginal importance in view of the 
complexity that ALALC displayed in any 
case. 
Perhaps this article is overstepping its 
own limits in concluding with conjectures 
on what ALALC might have been if a 
different path had been chosen. Only some 
of the Association's problems have been 
analysed here, and, in point of fact, it has also 
suffered from the action of a variety of factors 
and circumstances, like any other enterprise 
of such complexity. At the risk of oversimpli-
fication, the author deemed it preferable 
to single out the problems deriving from 
heterogeneity, because he feels them to 
be of paramount importance in accounting 
for the evolution of the movement. Aware of 
the fragility of any conjecture, he wanted 
at all events to explore the viability of the 
alternative structure proposed for ALALC 
at the start: the preferential area. And the 
analysis has led to the conclusion that it 
combined conditions which would have 
made it more feasible than the free-trade 
area that finally took its place. This opinion 
is not based on the a posteriori evidence 
of the actual evolution of ALALC, which 
in fact is now nothing more than a prefer-
ential area. It is based on the belief that the 
choice, at the right time, of an alternative 
of that kind would have made it possible 
to accommodate special situations with 
much greater flexibility, and to establish 
an efficacious compensation mechanism, 
without the necessity of requiring countries 
to adopt decisions that technically and 
politically they were not prepared to take. 
Such a preferential area as that could have 
been a living political reality, that is, 
something very different from the prefer-
ential area that ALALC has come to be by 
defect. 
That was not, of course, the only 
alternative. For example, it would also 
have been posible to follow the path of the 
free-trade area, but choosing a much more 
gradual process, allowing of subregionali-
zation and progress by stages with much 
longer deadlines. As CEPAL pointed out in 
the document in which it commented upon 
the results of the sessions of the Working 
Group on a Latin American Regional Mar-
ket: "This final objective must be constantly 
borne in mind, even though it can be 
reached only by gradual stages. In the first of 
these, aspirations would have to be confined 
to partial but attainable targets; and would 
necessarily have to be the patiently-nur-
tured issue of a policy conceived on realistic 
lines and implemented with firmness of 
purpose".(5) 
In any case, these references to valid 
options, besides being up to a point il-
lustrations of the method, have found a place 
in the present paper, because the future of 
Latin American integration is still a moot 
question, and one which is becoming in-
creasingly urgent. 
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The author would like to fell that this 
article has represented some contribution to 
research on the new paths that integration 
should follow. Renovation will be an un-
avoidable necessity in almost all the Latin 
American integration movements, and for 
ALALC it is an urgent one in addition. These 
pages make no claim to suggest such paths. 
The analysis of ALALC which has been 
put forward here refers to the circumstances 
prevailing when it was established, no to 
those existing today, which would have to 
be studied for that express purpose. But 
these reflections may be useful in pointing 
out certain requisites for action, to which 
careful thought should be given if the 
decision to seek integration is to be imbued 
with the blend of realism and boldness 
that it always requires. 
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Annex (Cont.) 
Population1* Gross national product0 
Country (thousands of Total 
inhabitants) (millions of 
3. Arab Economic Unity Council (CAEU) 
United Arab Emirates 656 
Iraq 11 120 
Jordan 2 709 
Kuwait 980 
Morocco 16 680 
Mauritania 1322 
Arab Republic of Egypt 37 096 
Arab Republic of Libya 2 442 
Arab Republic of Syria 7 409 
Arab Republic of Yemen 6 471 
The People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen 1 677 
Somalia 9180 















4. Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) 
Congo 1300 
Gabon 528 
Central African Empire 1 748 
United Republic of 
Cameroon 7120 
5. East African Community (EAC) 
Kenya 12 910 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 14 351 
Uganda 11 186 







Jamaica 2 008 
nJt A T l r P U l T G r ^^^^^^^^^ 
ivioiHserrai ———• 
St. Kitt-Nevis-Anguilla . 46 St. Lucia 108 
St. Vincent 91 






















































Gross national product? 
Country Population11 Total Per capita 
(thousands of (millions of (dollars) 
inhabitants) dollars) 
7. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 




























































aWorld Bank, World Bank Atlas: Population, Per Capita Product, and Growth Rates, 1976. 
bIn this annex the population figures given are for mid-1974. 
cThe gross national product data appearing in this annex are given at 1974 market prices. 
